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ABSTRACT
The climate change mitigation potential of energy technologies depends on how their
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions compare to global climate stabilization goals. Current
methods for comparing technologies, which assess impacts over an arbitrary, fixed time hori-
zon, do not acknowledge the critical link between technology choices and climate dynamics.
In this thesis, I ask how we can use information about the temporal characteristics of green-
house gases to design new metrics for comparing energy technologies.
I propose two new metrics: the Cumulative Climate Impact (CCI) and Instantaneous
Climate Impact (ICI). These metrics use limited information about the climate system,
such as the year when stabilization occurs, to calculate tradeoffs between greenhouse gases,
and hence the technologies that emit these gases. The CCI and ICI represent a middle
ground between current metrics and commonly-proposed alternatives, in terms of their level
of complexity and information requirements.
I apply the CCI and ICI to evaluate the climate change mitigation potential of energy
technologies in the transportation sector, with a focus on alternative fuels. I highlight key
policy debates about the role of (a) natural gas as a "bridge" to a low carbon energy future
and (b) third generation biofuels as a long-term energy solution. New metrics shed light on
critical timing-related questions that current metrics gloss over. If natural gas is a bridge
fuel, how long is this bridge? If algae biofuels are not commercially viable for the next twenty
years, can they still provide a significant climate benefit?
I simulate technology decisions using new metrics, and existing metrics like the Global
Warming Potential (GWP), identifying the conditions where new metrics improve on existing
methods as well as the conditions under which new metrics fail. I show that metrics of
intermediate complexity, such as the CCI and ICI, provide a simple, reliable, and policy-
relevant approach to technology evaluation and capture key features of the future climate
system. I extend these insights to energy technologies in the electricity sector as well as a
variety of environmental impact categories.
Thesis Supervisor: Jessika E. Trancik
Title: Assistant Professor of Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
World energy demand is expected to increase by 50% over the next 25 years, necessitating
major growth in new energy infrastructure [28]. Given the scale of the investments required
and the potential for devastating environmental impacts, designing and evaluating sustain-
able energy technologies presents a critical engineering challenge. Energy technologies carry
a range of environmental impacts. However, these impacts are difficult to assess because
they depend on aggregate characteristics of the environmental system - including green-
house gas concentrations, air pollution levels, and cumulative resource consumption - and
the proximity to large-scale climate change, human health, and natural resource thresholds.
As a result, a technology's impact can vary dramatically over time and across locations,
depending on the longevity and distribution of its life cycle emissions and resource use, and
the timing of thresholds. Humanity is rapidly approaching these critical thresholds [92].
Thus, understanding the dynamic interactions between energy technologies and an evolving
environmental system is essential.
This thesis focuses on the climate impacts of alternative transportation fuels. Trans-
portation represents 19% of energy consumption and 23% of energy-related carbon dioxide
(C0 2) emissions worldwide, and these emissions are expected to increase by more than 80%
in the next 35 years [49]. This rapid growth trajectory suggests that any reasonable policy
to reduce the climate and environmental impacts of energy consumption must include a plan
for substantial changes to the business-as-usual transportation system. Vehicle efficiency
improvements and reductions in travel demand can contribute to this goal. However, these
energy-saving solutions all have fundamental limits in their ability to reduce total emissions
(see Eq. 1.1).1 Ultimately, major reductions in emissions - to compensate for increasing
'iEq. 1.1 is called the Kaya identity [41, 86]. It is a variant on the popular IPAT identity, which represents
a generic environmental impact (I) as the product of population (P), affluence (A), and technology (T) [26].
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population and wealth per capita - can only be achieved through changes in the emissions
intensity of energy technologies. Thus, alternative fuels and other energy sources will be
critical for transforming the transportation sector.
. Wealth Energy EmissionsEm'issions =Population x x x(1)Population Wealth Energy
Evaluating the impacts of alternative transportation fuels is challenging. Fuels emit
a variety of pollutants, and these pollutants have different lifetimes and potencies. As a
result, comparisons of fuels change depending on the time horizon over which impacts are
evaluated. In addition, policies that impact fuel technology choices exist at many levels
of aggregation, and environmental goals are incorporated into these policies in different
ways. Policy options range from local and regional transportation planning to national
technology mandates and research portfolios to global emissions treaties. Previous research
on transportation fuels is equally fragmented, focusing on evaluating specific fuels across
multiple criteria [7], comparing multiple fuels against a single criterion [58], quantifying
changing environmental constraints [95], or performing location-specific impact assessments
[72]. However, the full meaning of these strands of research is not readily apparent in
isolation. We must draw on all of these insights to develop metrics that allow policymakers
at multiple decision-making scales to create policies whose collective outcomes meet climate
change mitigation goals.
1.2 Research Objectives
In this thesis, I propose new metrics for evaluating the climate change mitigation potential
of energy technologies, which capture the effects of a changing climate system on the dy-
namics of technology performance [24, 25]. These metrics have a wide variety of potential
applications. They can quantify tradeoffs between new technology designs in the laboratory,
prioritize among competing technologies for long-term infrastructure planning, and guide
policymakers in setting technology performance targets. I argue that metrics should link
individual technology decisions, or groups of connected decisions, to their collective envi-
ronmental impacts at local, regional, and global scales. At the same time, these metrics
must acknowledge uncertainty in the future state of the environmental system, and allow
this uncertainty to be reflected to decision-makers. Equally important, metrics must be ap-
propriate for the technology policy context in which they will be used, balancing simplicity
and transparency with a more comprehensive representation of environmental impacts.
Other impact-specific identities can be developed in the same vein as the Kaya identity, for example to study
the drivers of natural resource consumption or local and regional air pollution.
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I apply these new metrics to study the climate impacts of alternative transportation fuels.
Since fuels vary widely in the composition of greenhouse gases they emit, and these gases
have different heat trapping abilities and atmospheric lifetimes, we expect a fuel's climate
impact will depend on the timing and composition of its emissions and their relation to
changing climate constraints. This fact is often neglected in policy discussions. Natural gas,
for instance, has been proposed as a "bridge" to a low-carbon future [73]. While natural
gas has lower CO 2 emissions than coal for electricity or gasoline for transportation, it has
substantial non-CO 2 emissions [5]. Given these differences, it is unclear how to value natural
gas in a climate change mitigation portfolio. Is it a viable bridging technology, and if so how
long is the bridge? How do energy technologies with high non-CO 2 emissions compare to
those that emit primarily C0 2? To answer these critical policy questions, a new technology-
focused approach to valuing the impacts of greenhouse gases is needed.
My central research question is - how can we evaluate the environmental impacts of en-
ergy technologies in the context of a changing environmental system? I explore this question
in depth for the case of alternative transportation fuels and climate change and use this ex-
ample to identify general challenges and opportunities for developing environmental metrics,
which can be applied to a wide variety of technologies and impacts. My general research
question can be broken down further as follows:
1. How does the climate impact of a greenhouse gas depend on the timing of the emission
and the state of the climate system? How do emissions decisions using current metrics,
which do not reflect climate system dynamics, deviate from intended climate outcomes?
2. Can we use information about the temporal characteristics of greenhouse gases to
design new metrics for comparing alternative fuels? Under what conditions do these
new metrics improve on current metrics, and under what conditions do they fail?
3. How do alternative fuels compare, and how does this comparison depend on climate
conditions and mitigation goals? Can we develop general insights, such as preferred
pathways for technological change, that are robust to a range of future conditions?
4. How do social, political, and economic factors influence the tradeoffs between simple
and complex metrics, and their relationship to broader climate goals? Under what
conditions might different levels of complexity be preferred?
Answers to these four questions form the argument of my thesis. On the one hand, I
argue that the context of use matters for comparing energy technologies, and that metrics
that incorporate changing environmental constraints can improve technology choices to meet
climate change mitigation goals. On the other hand, I argue that the usefulness of metrics
that are tightly bound to detailed features of the climate system is limited by uncertainties
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in how this system will change over time, as well as political barriers to implementing and
revising complex metrics. This suggests that metrics of intermediate complexity, which
recognize the importance of context, limitations in scientific understanding, and the realities
of the political process, provide a possible way forward for evaluating the climate change
mitigation potential of alternative transportation fuels, and the environmental impacts of
energy technologies more broadly.
1.3 Thesis Structure
Following this introduction, Ch. 2 Background describes the specific energy technology
and environmental impact categories that I focus on in this thesis: alternative transportation
fuels and climate change. Sec. 2.1 reviews energy options for transportation, highlighting the
technical, economic, and environmental challenges with conventional and alternative fuels,
as well as other energy sources. Sec. 2.2 describes the role of greenhouse gases in climate
change, discussing historical efforts to compare greenhouse gases and options for comparing
gases for technology and climate policy. Ch. 3 Methods describes the approach I developed
to answer the research questions posed in this introduction, which uses a simple climate
model (Sec. 3.2) to develop and test new climate metrics (Sec. 3.3 and Sec. 3.4), and uses
these metrics along with emissions data (Sec. 3.1) to compare alternative transportation
fuel technologies (Sec. 3.5).
Ch. 4 Results introduces a new approach to classifying climate metrics (Sec. 4.1),
first providing insights from evaluating existing metrics (Sec. 4.2 and Sec. 4.3) and then
proposing and testing a new class of metrics (Sec. 4.4). I emphasize the role of climate
metrics in technology evaluation, illustrating what we learn about technologies when we
apply different metrics. Ch. 5 Discussion assesses how climate metrics relate to climate
and technology policy for transportation. Sec. 5.1 reviews current transportation policies
and discusses the role new climate metrics could play in these policies. Sec. 5.2 describes
the challenges in bringing new metrics into technology policymaking and identifies promising
policy areas for introducing new metrics. Sec. 5.3 then extends the insights developed in
this thesis to other technology evaluation and environmental challenges. Ch. 6 Conclusion
summarizes the key outcomes of this thesis and the answers to the four research questions
posed in the introduction.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, I review energy options for transportation and their technical, economic, and
environmental challenges (Sec. 2.1). I then discuss climate metrics and policy, focusing on
metrics for comparing the climate impacts of greenhouse gases and their application to tech-
nology evaluation (Sec. 2.2). In Ch. 3 Methods, and Ch. 4 Results, I focus in depth on
the specific case of alternative transportation fuels and climate change. Narrowing the scope
allows me to drill down into the technology and policy details of the problem and explore
how these details impact the usefulness and appropriateness of new types of environmental
performance metrics. At the same time, the more general background provided in this chap-
ter places the insights from these later chapters within a broader technical, economic, and
environmental context.
2.1 Energy and Transportation
2.1.1 Energy Options for Transportation
The transportation sector is a major contributor to energy consumption and therefore also
climate change and other environmental impacts. Currently, transportation is overwhelm-
ingly dominated by petroleum, which supplies 95% of transportation energy demand world-
wide. Other energy sources, including natural gas fuels (primarily CNG and LNG, and to
a lesser extent methanol), biofuels from a variety of source crops (including bioethanol and
biodiesel), and electricity (using plug-in hybrid and battery electric vehicles), represent only
5% of total energy use globally (see Fig. 2.1). However, these fuels are expected to play a
more significant role in the future, partially due to their potential to mitigate climate change
and other environmental impacts. The U.S., Europe, Brazil, and other countries are aggres-
sively promoting biofuel production and use, and one estimate - albeit uncertain - suggests
that 27% of transportation energy could be supplied by biofuels by 2050 [49]. Natural gas is
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also being discussed as a serious contender, particularly in the U.S., where recent discoveries
of large unconventional gas reserves are making the infrastructure investment required to
shift to natural gas more economical. Electrification is also becoming more feasible with
improvements in batteries and other related vehicle technologies.
A.
Other Sectors
Truck and Rail
Light Duty
~~ on2%
6%
23% 3%
11%
1%
* Shipping
F Aviation
Other Transport
C.
28%
Other Sectors
Truck and Rail
Light Duty
2%
7%
2%
16%
1%
* Shipping
U Aviation
Other Transport
B.
E 3.0%
5.6%
1.8%
0.8%
L Oil Products U Biofuels Natural Gas 99 Other
7.3%
D.
4.3%
2.7%
0.3%
Oil Products U Biofuels Natural Gas 0 Electricity
Figure 2.1: Transportation is a major contributor to (A.) global and (C.) U.S. energy con-
sumption, with the majority of this contribution coming from light duty vehi-
cles and trucks. Transport energy supply is heavily dominated by petroleum
both (B.) globally and (D.) in the U.S., although both show some contributions
from biofuels, natural gas, and other sources. Data source: [28, 48].
However, in spite of the apparent optimism surrounding alternative energy, there are
serious obstacles to fueling a significant share of transportation demand with non-petroleum
sources. Petroleum fuels such as gasoline and diesel perform well across a wide range of
criteria: they are energy-dense, easy to transport and store, and relatively low cost. There
have also been enormous investments in optimizing petroleum vehicles as well as petroleum
extraction, refinement, and distribution [49]. These conditions suggest that climate change
mitigation may be more difficult for the transportation sector than the electricity sector.
They also imply a critical role for other mitigation options, including improved energy ef-
ficiency, transportation mode switching, and reductions in travel demand. However, given
the major emissions reductions required to meet commonly-cited climate goals, these other
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measures, while necessary, are likely to be insufficient on their own. This is particularly true
in light of growing populations and increased mobility in developing countries. A low carbon
energy source must be part of the solution.
2.1.2 Technical and Economic Challenges
Large-scale deployment of alternative transportation energy sources presents serious techni-
cal and economic challenges. While my analysis focuses primarily on environmental impacts,
technical and economic factors are also critical, and must be considered in conjunction with
environmental concerns. I discuss these challenges in the context of three energy carriers:
biofuels, natural gas, and electricity - highlighting the diversity of challenges within and
among them. Still, even with this diversity, some common themes are evident. First, coor-
dination challenges are huge. Fuel and vehicle infrastructure must be coordinated for a new
fuel to enter the market. This makes fuels that are compatible with current infrastructure,
or fuels that are deployed in specialized market segments, particularly attractive. Second,
investments in alternative fuels, while expanding, are dwarfed by the combined investments
in conventional fuels and infrastructure over the past century. Consequently, the attractive-
ness of alternative fuels may improve with increased production, through learning-by-doing,
economies of scale, and other effects.
Biofuels. Biofuels can be divided into three major categories: first, second, and third
generation fuels (for general studies see [8, 57]).1 First generation biofuels are made from
traditional crops, usually by converting sugar crops into ethanol or oil crops into biodiesel.2
These fuels currently dominate the biofuels market, although there is concern that they are
distorting food markets and making food crops more expensive, and that a major scale-up of
first generation biofuels would intensify this effect [30]. First generation biofuels also tend to
be resource-intensive, requiring high-quality agricultural land and substantial irrigation and
fertilizer contributions. At the same time, processing techniques for first generation biofuels
are relatively well-developed. Bioethanol can be added to conventional gasoline in limited
amounts without changes to gasoline vehicles; biodiesel is compatible with existing diesel
vehicles. However, higher ethanol blends require specialized vehicles. Thus, first generation
biofuels have some advantages, but their production requirements and competition with
'The definition of first, second, and third generation biofuels differs somewhat across different
sources, and all of these definitions necessarily involve generalizations that may not hold across all po-
tential biofuel sources. I use the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's definition as a guide (see
www.epa,.gov/ricea/biofuels/basicinfo.htm i).
2Major players in the first generation biofuels market include sugar cane ethanol from Brazil, corn ethanol
from the U.S., and rapeseed biodiesel from Europe. Soy biodiesel also makes up a small amount of U.S. biofuel
production; other crops such as palm oil biodiesel are also popular, particularly in developing countries.
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agricultural products are problematic.
Second generation biofuels are made from cellulosic material, often agricultural waste
or plants grown on marginal land.3 Since these inputs typically do not compete with tra-
ditional agricultural land, they avoid the food/fuel dilemma prevalent with first generation
biofuels. However, agricultural wastes have important uses, often as fertilizer, so the value of
these uses must be considered when assessing agricultural wastes for biofuel production [87].
Furthermore, converting cellulosic material into fuel (typically bioethanol) requires consid-
erably more processing than for the sugar and oil inputs of first generation biofuels. While
there is potential to bioengineer crops that are easier to process, or organisms that can help
break down their cellulosic material, these advances are still in the design stage, and altered
plants may not be able to survive and thrive [40]. Additionally, many second generation
inputs are less densely produced than first generation crops, and there are costs associated
with gathering these inputs. For these reasons, and due to constraints on the availability of
agricultural wastes, second generation biofuels may have limited scalability.
Third generation biofuels are made from plants that are genetically modified for high
productivity, rapid growth, and easy extraction of oil or other fuel inputs. Algae has received
a lot of attention in recent years as a promising third generation biofuel - in fact, some
references equate algae fuels and third generation biofuels (e.g. the U.S. EPA). Algae has
many advantages as a potential biofuel: it grows relatively quickly and generates oil that
can be converted into biodiesel using first generation biofuel processing techniques. It also
grows in locations that do not compete with agricultural land or other land requirements.
However, there are many obstacles to producing large quantities of algae biodiesel, some of
which may be characteristic of third generation biofuels in general [60]. First, developing an
optimized oil-producing algae strain is challenging, particularly because there is a tradeoff
between oil production and plant growth. Second, even high-yield algae will likely require
expensive growing infrastructure and CO 2 "feeding" to grow at sufficiently rapid rates. In
the case of algae, methane produced by algae during the growth process could be captured
and burned to offset some of these energy costs. Thus, while third generation biofuels provide
a promising option for the future, serious technical and economic challenges remain.
Natural Gas. The recent, dramatic rise in production of unconventional natural gas
resources has prompted the U.S. and other countries to consider an expanded role for natural
gas in the transportation sector.4 Natural gas can be used to fuel transportation in a number
of ways: compressed natural gas (CNG), liquified natural gas (LNG), and synthetic fuels such
3 Examples of second generation biofuels include switchgrass and other grasses, willow and other fast-
growing woody plants, and agricultural wastes such as corn stover and rice husks.
4 Natural gas that requires certain types of specialized technology to access is collectively termed "uncon-
ventional gas." Examples of unconventional gas include tight sands, coal bed methane, and gas shales.
17
as methanol, ethanol, and diesel. Each of these options carries different costs and benefits (see
[73] for an overview). CNG and LNG both require a substantial investment in compatible
vehicles and refueling infrastructure. CNG shows promise, particularly for limited-range,
heavy-duty fleet vehicles such as buses. Currently, the cost of CNG passenger vehicles is high,
making the payback period too long for the average consumer; however, vehicles in Europe
are considerably less expensive. This suggests that the economics of CNG vehicles may
improve in the future. LNG requires a larger infrastructure investment but may be suitable
for specialized markets, such as long-haul trucking. Natural gas can also be converted to
synthetic fuels, including methanol, ethanol, and diesel, which are compatible with current
gasoline and diesel infrastructure. However, these fuels require additional processing and
may not be cost-competitive with petroleum-derived fuels. As compared to the first, second,
and third generation biofuels discussed above, producing natural gas fuels presents less of a
challenge, but distribution, coordination of fuel and vehicle markets, and economic viability
are still critical concerns.
Electric Vehicles. Electric vehicles are often discussed as an alternative to liquid (and
gaseous) fuels such as biofuels and natural gas fuels. Since electricity in the U.S. is rela-
tively inexpensive, using electricity to power the transportation sector is very attractive. In
principle, other fuels (for example, hydrogen) could be created from electricity, but I focus
on using electricity to charge a battery, as in a battery electric or plug-in hybrid vehicle.
Vehicles powered on conventional and alternative fuels have major advantages over these
types of electric vehicles, including ease of refueling and superior driving range. Accessible
charging infrastructure and improved battery technologies are essential to the future via-
bility of electric vehicles [110, 117]. Therefore, the potential for electric vehicles to scale
in the marketplace depends on the evolution and cost of battery technologies, as well as
the range and performance demands of consumers. A successful future energy scenario for
the transportation sector may require a combination of electric vehicles for short trips and
alternative fuel vehicles for longer trips and specialized applications such as aviation.
2.1.3 Climate and Environmental Impacts
The environmental impacts of alternative transportation fuels and other energy sources vary
widely. I discuss these impacts for the same fuel categories analyzed above. Since impacts
accrue during the extraction, production, and use of a fuel, a life cycle perspective is es-
sential to accurately compare fuel technology options. Traditional life cycle assessment uses
a bottom-up, process-based approach to calculate emissions and resource consumption of
technologies. However, this accounting process can be challenging for several reasons. First,
there is considerable variability in the impacts associated with a given fuel, since impacts
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depend on sourcing choices, farming practices, processing techniques, and transportation
requirements. Data on these variables is often sparse. Second, data limitations are even
nore acute for emerging technologies that have not yet reached commercial scale, and for
technologies that are changing rapidly over time. Finally, many fuels have co-products dur-
ing their production and processing. However, there is no single, objective methodology for
dividing environmental impacts among co-products, and different methods can lead to very
different results for environmental impact assessments.
Beyond these direct impacts, fuels also carry a variety of indirect, system-level impacts
that are difficult to measure. Choosing to use a particular fuel technology can have reper-
cussions on other technology choices and economic sectors, as well as other impacts not
captured in conventional life cycle assessments. For example, expanding crop production
for biofuels often requires converting land previously not used for agricultural production.
If this land is a carbon sink, then using this land for biofuel production results in carbon
emissions. Other examples of indirect emissions include large infrastructure changes for fuel
distribution and production, which are often ignored or only partially included in life cycle
assessments. Furthermore, many life cycle assessments focus on the level of a small unit of
technology (for example, driving a vehicle one mile with a particular fuel), and understand-
ing how these choices impact complex, large-scale social, technical, and economic systems is
not easy. These impacts may also change over time as systems evolve.
In addition to measuring the actual environmental emissions and resource consumption
characteristics of individual technologies, we must be able to link these characteristics to
impacts on natural and human systems. This becomes more challenging when moving from
the level of an individual emission (e.g. C0 2) to an impact category (e.g. climate change)
to comparing multiple categories (e.g. the "climate/water nexus"). See Fig. 2.2 for a subset
of criteria over which fuels might be judged. Often when assessing environmental impacts,
impacts within categories are weighted and aggregated into a single impact score; these
scores are then weighted and aggregated again into an overall measure of environmental
impact. Choosing a weighting scheme requires evaluations of uncertain scientific information,
predictions about the evolution of human and natural systems, and judgements about the
relative harm of different impacts, which may be nonlinear given the presence of thresholds
in environmental systems. Since fuels vary in the types of environmental impacts they
create, weighting schemes can have a dramatic influence on the perceived attractiveness
of technologies options. We would also expect preferred weighting schemes to vary across
locations, over time, and among different stakeholders [104].
Biofuels. The environmental impacts of biofuels, and particularly their climate impacts,
are highly contentious. Although biofuels can theoretically have net zero greenhouse gas
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Figure 2.2: Transportation fuels are difficult to compare because they carry a variety of
environmental impacts. Purple denotes climate impacts, yellow urban air pol-
lution, green general air pollution, blue acid rain, and red energy security.
Emissions are given in grams per mile and petroleum (oil) consumption in
BTU per mile. Data source: GREET Version 2012.
emissions, since the CO 2 released during fuel combustion is removed from the atmosphere
by biofuel crops as they grow, a full life cycle assessment reveals that these fuels can be
quite greenhouse gas intensive and carry a wide variety of other environmental impacts.
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First generation biofuels, which currently dominate biofuel markets, often rely on energy,
fertilizer, and irrigation-intensive farming practices, which lead to greenhouse gas emissions
and other negative environmental impacts [39, 46, 47, 66, 119]. Emissions from land use
changes are also a critical concern [76, 111]. Converting land from other natural states, for
example forests and wetlands, releases greenhouse gases, and it can take years for a biofuel to
overcome this carbon deficit and begin to generate a net climate benefit [21]. Determining
land use change emissions requires an assessment of how biofuel production will impact
agricultural markets more broadly, and how much and what type of land will be converted
to meet increased demand. Given the uncertain environmental impacts of first generation
biofuels, there have been active debates as to whether these fuels have net energy and climate
benefits over conventional fuels [29].
Part of the impetus for investing in second and third generation biofuels is to alleviate
the environmental impacts inherent in first generation biofuels. Second generation biofuels
show promise from an environmental perspective, since they are often a byproduct of other
agricultural processes or grown on less favorable land. However, these fuels still impact the
environment [7, 106, 119]. Agricultural waste already has uses in the agricultural system
(for example, as a fertilizer) and must be replaced if waste products are used as a biofuel;
other second generation crops still require land use changes and incur emissions from these
changes [21, 76]. Nevertheless, second generation biofuels tend to improve on first generation
options in terms of environmental impacts. Third generation biofuels, which have been
engineered especially for biofuel production, could also have lower environmental impacts
and greenhouse gas emissions. However, controlling the growing environment to optimize
third generation biofuel production, for example through CO 2 feeding, can be resource-
intensive and environmentally damaging [13, 15]. Other environmental issues with third
generation biofuels are very fuel-specific; for example, CH4 leakage is a critical concern for
algae biofuel production [33].
Natural Gas. Natural gas essentially is CH 4 , and it burns to produce CO 2. However,
when considering the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of natural gas, the fugitive CH4
emissions that occur during gas production and transportation are critical. The rise in
unconventional gas has also led scientists and policymakers to question how its CH 4 emissions
compare to those of conventional gas [116]. Some have even argued that, depending on
CH 4 leakage rates during well completion, the CO 2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions of
natural gas may be worse than those of coal, which is far more C0 2-intensive [44]. Other
authors have criticized these findings [11], but an active debate continues in the policy
community. The comparison of conventional and unconventional gas is complicated because
conventional sources have additional CH4 emissions from liquid unloading, which is typically
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not performed for unconventional sources [106, 118]. Given the high climate impacts of
CH 4, it is clear that more data on current practices is needed [5, 45]. Beyond its climate
impact, unconventional natural gas is also mined in locations not accustomed to oil and
gas production. Among other community impacts, there is particular concern about gas
contamination of water resources [73]. However, natural gas has fewer local and regional air
quality impacts than many other fuel options.
Electricity. Electric vehicles have no direct emissions during vehicle driving since there
is no fuel being directly combusted in the vehicle. However, there are significant upstream
emissions associated with the extraction, generation, and transmission of the electricity used
to power electric vehicles, and these emissions must be counted in a full life cycle assessment.
These emissions depend on the electricity generation mix, and can vary depending on the time
of day and the geographical location of vehicle charging. The current electricity mix in the
U.S. is fairly fossil fuel and carbon-intensive, although studies suggest that electric vehicles in
the U.S. still do have climate benefits over conventional gasoline vehicles [27]. While electric
vehicles eliminate some of the local air pollution concerns associated with conventional and
alternative fuels, they tend to perform worse in terms of regional air quality, particularly acid
rain, due to emissions from coal-fired power plants (see Fig. 2.2). However, it may be easier
to mitigate climate and environmental impacts in the electricity sector, both because the
emissions sources are easier to control and because there are more options for decarbonizing
the electricity mix. Therefore, the impacts of electric vehicles may decrease significantly in
the future.
2.2 Climate Metrics and Policy
2.2.1 Greenhouse Gases and Climate
The Earth's climate is a highly complex system driven by dynamic interactions between the
atmosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere. Historically, the Earth has experienced
periods of rapid climate change due to internal feedbacks among these subsystems, which
are often characterized by nonlinear or threshold behavior, and external influences on the
climate, called forcings [4]. While these forcings can take many forms, recent climate changes
are attributed to human-induced changes in the Earth's energy, or radiative, balance [102].
This phenomenon is referred to as radiative forcing.' Radiative forcing operates through two
processes. First, when energy reaches the Earth's surface, part of this energy is re-radiated
5 Radiative forcing is measured in units of energy imbalance per unit time (or power imbalance) per unit
surface area, e.g. W/m 2 , at the tropopause, the boundary between the troposphere and the stratosphere.
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back into the atmosphere. While some of this energy radiates back out into space, a portion
of it is also absorbed by certain gases and reradiated back towards the Earth's surface. This
blanketing effect, which is responsible for keeping the Earth's temperature hospitable to
humans and other forms of life, is called the greenhouse effect, and the gases that produce
this effect are called greenhouse gases. Second, some forcings, such as aerosols and black
carbon, can effect the Earth's energy balance by absorbing or reflecting sunlight directly.
The most conmon greenhouse gases, in terms of their total greenhouse effect, are water
vapor and CO 2. CO 2 represents the largest human contribution to climate change. However,
a host of secondary greenhouse gases and climate forcings, many of which are largely emitted
by humans, are also influential (see Fig. 2.3). Together, these secondary gases contribute
almost as much radiative forcing as CO 2 . In fact, while policy discussions often simplify the
climate problem to a "carbon" (i.e. C0 2) problem, it may be impossible to meet commonly-
cited climate goals without addressing non-CO 2 radiative forcing [85]. After C0 2 , which
represents 63% of long-lived forcings, CH 4 is the second largest contributor to persistent
forcing, at 18%, followed by N20 at 6%, with the contribution of the latter growing rapidly
in recent years [102]. While ozone depleting compounds influenced the initial development
of climate metrics, these substances represent a small share of total forcing, at around 12%
combined, and their radiative forcing has declined in absolute terms since the late 1990's
[102].
Linking radiative forcing perturbations to actual climate impacts is challenging. Increases
in radiative forcing are expected to lead to a number of impacts, which the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) collectively terms "dangerous an-
thropogenic interference" (DAI) [112] and later refined to include five "reasons for concern"
(RFCs) [69]. In science policy discussions, DAI is most frequently operationalized as a 2*C
temperature threshold, which was formalized by the UNFCCC in 2009 [114]. In addition to
its political importance, the 2*C threshold also has scientific significance, and is a commonly-
cited safe level for avoiding large-scale discontinuities in the climate system,6 one of the most
critical RFCs [101]. However, the climate impacts resulting from an increasing abundance
of greenhouse gases are complex and highly uncertain, and are likely to be unevenly dis-
tributed across locations and disproportionately borne by future generations. Furthermore,
given the potential for non-linear and irreversible changes to the climate, balancing the costs
and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions is a difficult proposition.
Connecting greenhouse gases and climate impacts is further complicated by the fact that
these gases have very different physical properties. Compared to C0 2 , CH 4 and N2 0 are
much more efficient at trapping heat: a gram of CH 4 traps 102 times as much energy as a
60ther safe levels of climate change has also been proposed (see [63]). Note that many consider the 2 C
thresholds to be too high for vulnerable regions and populations.
23
Radiative Forcing Terms
Long-lived
greenhouse gases
Ozone
Stratospheric
water vapour
Surface albedo,
Direct effect
Total
Aerosol Cloud abedo
Linear contrails
Solar irradiance
Total n t
human activities
-2
Stratospheric -
-0.05)
Land use
-1 0 1
Figure 2.3: Since pre-industrial times, there have been human-induced and natural changes
to the Earth's radiative forcing budget (in W/m 2). The total effect of human
activities is positive (i.e. warming), although the exact value is subject to con-
siderable uncertainty, which is largely driven by uncertainties in aerosol physics
and chemistry. Image source: [102].
gram of C0 2 ; a gram of N20 traps 216 times as much (see Fig. 2.4). These three gases also
have different lifetimes in the atmosphere, with CH 4 being removed in a matter of decades
and N20 on the order of a century. The removal of CO 2 is governed by a complex process
of continual exchange with carbon sinks in the ocean and biosphere; some CO 2 is removed
almost instantaneously, while some CO 2 is essentially permanent on timescales meaningful
for climate policy (i.e. thousands of years), and the average lifetime is on the order of a
hundred years [103]. Other climate forcings such as aerosols, black carbon, and ozone have
much shorter lifetimes (i.e. less than a year), and many ozone depleting substances have
much longer lifetimes (i.e. thousands of years). Given their diverse physics, there is no single
exchange rate that objectively converts one greenhouse gas into an equivalent amount of
another gas. The exchange rate inevitably involves value judgements.
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2.2.2 History of Climate Metrics
Contemporary climate metrics were not initially designed for climate policy. They were de-
veloped in the context of the Montreal Protocol, which regulates ozone depleting substances
[79]. Since some ozone depleting substances are also greenhouse gases, there was interest
in how ozone policies might have secondary effects on climate change. In 1988, Rogers and
Stephens proposed the first measure for comparing the climate impacts of ozone depleting
substances, which they called the greenhouse warming potential [94]. This metric was in-
spired by the ozone depleting potential (ODP), a metric proposed by Wuebbles in 1983 to
compare the steady state ozone depletion resulting from a step change in the emission of a
substance, compared to the reference CFC- 11 [120].' In 1990, Fisher et al. proposed a similar
metric, the halocarbon global warming potential (HGWP), which in parallel with the ODP
compared the steady state radiative forcing of ozone depleting compounds [31]. The HGWP
was also incorporated in reports by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) on
stratospheric ozone, indicating that the idea of climate metrics was gaining traction in the
policy community [1].
The HGWP concept, legitimized under the Montreal Protocol and initially restricted to
ozone depleting compounds, was later extended to other greenhouse gases by Lashof and
7The destruction of stratospheric ozone by ozone depleting substances can be well approximated as a
linear function of concentration. As a result, the steady state impact of a step change in emissions is
equivalent to the integrated impact of a pulse emission from the time of emission to the time steady state is
reached (see [77]). The same reasoning applies to for the GWP concept when restricted to ozone depleting
substances, since these substances exhibit an approximately linear relationship between concentration and
radiative forcing, but does not apply for common greenhouse gases such as C0 2 , CH4 , and N2 0.
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Ahuja [62]. The authors proposed the global warming potential (GWP) as the radiative
forcing due to an emission of a greenhouse gas at t = 0, relative to an equivalent mass
emission of C0 2 , integrated to infinity, where future radiative forcing was discounted using
standard economic procedures: 8'9
f" RE (GHG) -e* t dtGWP (GHG) =fo RF (C ) t dt (2.1)f 0" RF (CO2) - dt
where RF denotes the radiative forcing of a given greenhouse gas (GHG or C0 2), and r is
the discount rate. Rodhe proposed an alternative formulation, which integrates radiative
forcing over a fixed time horizon:
f RF (GHG) dtGWP (GHG)=- 07' (2.2)fj RF(CO2)dt '
where T is the time horizon [93]. This is equivalent to a special case of the Lashof and Ahuja
formulation, where the discount function is equal to one up to time T and zero afterwards.
Derwent subsequently extended Rodhe's work by calculating the GWP for three example
time horizons: 20, 100, and 500 years [22].
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a scientific body established
by the United Nations to address climate change, later picked up the Rodhe formulation with
the three time horizons proposed by Derwent, introducing the modern GWP formulation to
the policy community [43]. The IPCC emphasized the uncertainties in the GWP concept
and stated in particular that the three example time horizons were "presented as candidates
for discussion and should not be considered as having any special significance" [42, page 59].
In spite of these reservations, the GWP with a 100 year time horizon was adopted by the
Kyoto Protocol in 1998 as a basis for regulating greenhouse gas emissions [113]. Values for
the GWP were taken from the then latest IPCC report [61] but have not been revised since,
although the protocol explicitly states that the GWP should be periodically reviewed and
revised:
"...the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the
Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise the global warming
8 The analogy between step emissions and integrated pulse emissions does not hold for C0 2 , CH4 , and
N2 0, which have a non-linear relationship between concentration and radiative forcing. This meant that
Lashof and Ahuja needed to make an explicit choice between the two formulations. They chose the latter to
emphasize the impacts of individual emissions decisions, as opposed to emissions trends [77].
9Since some portion of CO2 emissions remain in the atmosphere essentially permanently, Lashof and
Ahuja forced the CO2 removal function to zero after a time period of 1,000 years to prevent the denominator
from reaching infinity. However, although the choice of time period was fairly arbitrary, they found that
their GWP changed significantly depending on the time period selected.
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potential of each such greenhouse gas, taking fully into account any relevant
decisions by the Conference of the Parties." [113, p. 6].
Since its introduction, the GWP has triggered various critiques [68]. Suggestions for
addressing these critiques range from relatively small changes, such as updating GWP values
based on new scientific information and climate conditions [98, 102], to intermediate changes
such as changing the time horizon for calculating the GWP [82], to dramatic changes, such as
changing from the integrated, radiative forcing-based GWP to an instantaneous, temperature
based global temperature potential (GTP) [100] (see [341 for a review). Some economists
argue that metrics should explicitly balance the costs of climate change with benefits derived
from activities that emit greenhouse gases, either by translating simple physical metrics into
measures of economic damages or by simulating tradeoffs between gases in an integrated
assessment model [67, 90]. However, reaching a consensus on the value of costs and benefits
is extremely difficult, if not impossible [37]. Given the many inherent scientific, political,
and economic uncertainties, some argue that the GWP is "good enough" for its intended
application, at least under certain assumptions [36, 78].
To avoid these normative issues, some scientists favor grouping gases based on their
physics, and prohibiting comparisons between groups [18]. This policy avoids the perverse
tradeoffs inherent in greenhouse gas trading: since a fraction of CO 2 emissions remain in
the atmosphere indefinitely, trading a temporary decrease in CH 4 for a temporary increase
in CO 2 hurts prospects for long-term climate stabilization [68]. At the same time, since the
climate system is complex and nonlinear, temporary increases in radiative forcing can lead to
long-term, possibly permanent, impacts. Furthermore, studies find that allowing greenhouse
gas trading reduces the total costs of climate change mitigation [90]. More fundamentally,
climate metrics have important applications for which methods for grouping gases are in-
appropriate. In technology assessments, technologies are routinely compared based on their
C0 2-equivalent emissions. While complex models could theoretically simulate the impacts of
multi-gas emissions from technologies, this approach is too cumbersome for informing fine-
grained technology choices, such as those required to select technology portfolios, prioritize
among new designs in the laboratory, and set technology performance targets. For these
applications, comparing gases on a single scale is difficult but necessary.
2.2.3 Questions for Designing Metrics
Given the strong argument for comparing greenhouse gases on a common scale, how can
we do this better? Early debates on the benefits and drawbacks of popular climate metrics
emphasized that metrics cannot be evaluated until a set of evaluation criteria is identified
[77]. Since greenhouse gases have vastly different temporal dynamics, no single metric can
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produce identical radiative forcing pathways across all possible combinations of greenhouse
gas emissions. I suggest that the major science policy debates that emerge out of the design
and evaluation of climate metrics can be analyzed in the context of four major questions: (1)
at what step in the emissions-to-impacts chain should we compare gases?, (2) should we use
an instantaneous, integrated, or rate-based indicator?, (3) how should we balance short-term
and long-term climate changes?, and (4) should climate metrics change over time or adapt
to new information? I discuss each of these important questions below.
At what step in the emissions-to-impacts chain should we compare gases? Cli-
mate science, economics, and policy research seeks to understand the complex process that
relates emissions of greenhouse gases to damages to human wellbeing and the natural envi-
ronment. Several steps along this chain could be selected as a basis for comparing greenhouse
gases, ranging from radiative forcing to climate impacts (see Fig. 2.5). Steps at the begin-
ning and the end of the chain have inherent tradeoffs. Steps near the beginning are easier to
measure, whereas steps near the end are more uncertain and difficult to quantify; however,
steps near the end are also more meaningful for policymaking. This tradeoff relates to a
broader literature on performance indicators. One analysis organizes indicators into three
groups: (1) behavioral indicators, which measure the performance of individual actors, (2)
intervening indicators, which measure performance somewhere along a causal chain, and
(3) consummatory indicators, which measure performance in terms of ultimate policy goals
[91]. Radiative forcing and temperature change (intervening indicators) are common indi-
cators for comparing greenhouse gases, although rudimentary estimates of climate damages
(consummatory indicators) are also sometimes used. Greenhouse gas emissions indicators
(behavioral indicators) are more common in other areas of climate policy.
Greenhouse Atmospheric Radiative Climate Climate Impacts
GasEmissions Concentrations Forcing Changes
Figure 2.5: Simple causal chain tracing greenhouse gas emissions to ultimate climate im-
pacts. Moving down the causal chain, metrics become more uncertain and
difficult to quantify but also more policy-relevant. Adapted from: [34].
Should we use an instantaneous, integrated, or rate-based indicator? After se-
lecting the indicator for comparing greenhouse gases, we must determine how this indicator
will be formatted. Options include rates of change in the indicator, the total magnitude of
the indicator, the indicator value integrated over time, or a hybrid of these three approaches.
All of these options have scientific and policy significance. For example, rates of change in
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radiative forcing can determine the ability of human and natural systems to adapt to climate
changes, with slower rates allowing more time to adapt. At the same time, the magnitude
of radiative forcing can govern ultimate changes to the climate system, such as temperature
changes or increases in extreme weather events. On the other hand, climate damages are
commonly associated with cumulative radiative forcing, with the important exception of
non-linear and threshold effects. These three values may also be correlated. For instance,
higher rates of change in radiative forcing lead to a higher magnitude of forcing and higher
cumulative forcing. For this reason, maximum temperature change (an instantaneous mea-
sure) is often cited as a broad policy target that roughly correlates with other secondary
indicators of interest, including climate damages. However, others argue that climate policy
must move beyond this simplistic approach to a more nuanced understanding of climate
change indicators and safety thresholds [63].
How should we balance short-term and long-term climate impacts? Regardless
of the indicator selected for comparing greenhouse gases, the treatment of time is critical.
Greenhouse gases vary widely in terms of their potencies and atmospheric lifetimes (see
Fig. 2.4). Given these dramatically different properties, the emphasis placed on short-term
versus long-term impacts can greatly affect the comparison of greenhouse gases, particularly
CO 2 and CH 4 and to a lesser extend CO 2 and N2 0. If we compare one gram of CH4 to one
gram of CO 2 at the time these gases are emitted, the impact of CH 4 is over one hundred
times higher than that of CO2 . If instead we compare these gases seventy years after they are
emitted, the impacts are almost equal. Thus, technologies with high CH 4 emissions perform
worse in short-term impact assessments, whereas those with high CO 2 emissions perform
worse in long-term assessments. These difficulties in balancing short-term and long-term
impacts relate to a broader literature in environmental economics (and other economics
disciplines) on discounting future costs and benefits [37]. Definitions of intergenerational
equity and fairness in these complex systems are not objective and may vary across different
stakeholders, some of whom do not have a voice in the policy process.
Should climate metrics change over time or adapt to new information? Beyond
issues concerning the appropriate indicator and treatment of time, many other types of spe-
cialized science, technology, and policy knowledge are required to design and calculate cli-
mate metrics. Scientific information about greenhouse gases - including their heat-trapping
abilities, atmospheric lifetimes, and effects on other greenhouse gases - is constantly evolv-
ing (see [98]). Many of these variables are also expected to change over time; for example,
greenhouse gases tend to trap heat less efficiently as their concentrations increase. As a
result, the tradeoffs between greenhouse gases change as relative concentrations increase or
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decrease. Some of these changes are predictable, suggesting that changing values for metrics
could be determined in advance, whereas others are unpredictable, suggesting the need for
planned metric adaptation. However, some policymakers argue that the benefits of dynamic
and/or adaptive metrics do not outweigh the implementation costs. Updating metrics may
also affect their credibility to policymakers or the perceived legitimacy of the process, if
stakeholders are not consulted each time metrics are updated [23].
2.2.4 Review of Alternative Metrics
A wide variety of alternative climate metrics have been proposed in the literature (see [341 for
a review). Given the GWP's popularity in climate policy and technology evaluation, many
proposals use this metric as a point of departure. Studies have highlighted the critical role
of the GWP time horizon for comparing energy technologies [105] and proposed alternative
time horizons based on historical data or other criteria [107]. Some researchers, primarily
from the life cycle assessment community, reject the idea of a single time horizon and instead
focus on calculating the amount of time it would take for a policy decision (e.g. a sustained
technology change) to generate a net climate benefit [5]. Other papers update the GWP
to reflect the timing of greenhouse gas emissions in the technology life cycle.' 0 All of these
GWP-like metrics provide insight into how modifying the GWP can change the results of
technology evaluations. However, they neglect broader questions about the appropriateness
of the GWP in general, and the conditions under which it performs well or poorly.
Other alternative metrics differ more substantially from the GWP but maintain its rela-
tive simplicity. Since the simplicity of the GWP is one of the key arguments for its continued
use, it is worthwhile to examine other simple alternatives. The most common metric in
this category is the Global Temperature Potential (GTP), which compares the temperature
change AT due to an emission of a greenhouse gas, compared to C0 2, a given number of
years r in the future, where temperature change is a function of radiative forcing but may
involve a lag term [100].
GTP (GHG) =AT [RF (GHG)] (2.3)
AT [RF(C0 2 )]
As with the GWP, the value of the GTP can change dramatically depending on the treatment
of time; in this case, a single point in time is selected instead of a period of time.
Another set of simple metrics, promoted by the economics community, take physical
metrics like the GWP and GTP one step further and convert them to a measure of climate
'For instance, to calculate the GWP for a new, coal-fired power plant, emissions during the first year of
plant construction is integrated over 100 years, whereas emissions from decommissioning the plant 80 years
later is only integrated for 20 years. Emissions during the use phase are adjusted in a similar manner.
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damages [100]. These metrics are typically integrated and involve some form of discounting;
thus, they are similar in spirit to early proposals for the GWP (see Eq. 2.1). However,
converting radiative forcing or temperature changes to climate damages is difficult. Often, a
simple, linear relationship between temperature changes and economic damages is assumed.
When such a simple conversion is used, it is questionable whether economic metrics provide
a meaningful advantage over purely physical metrics like the GWP and GTP. Thus, it is
perhaps more meaningful to view the GWP, GTP, and these economic metrics as examples
of a class of simple climate metrics with many common properties: they take on a constant
value and have a closed functional form that can be calculated by hand. This simplicity
provides certain usability advantages, which I describe in more detail in Ch. 5.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, other researchers, primarily from the integrated
assessment community, have proposed a set of highly complex climate metrics. These metrics
typically assume a scenario for future climate change and economic activity and calculate
either (a) the costs and benefits of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions along this scenario
[55] or (b) the cost-effectiveness of mitigating emissions given a specific climate goal, such
as a 2*C temperature threshold [67, 89]. These metrics do not have a closed functional form
but rather come from the output of an integrated assessment model; thus, they may be less
user-friendly the simple climate metrics described above. Complex metrics may also change
over time without a clear pattern, whereas the simple metrics typically have a constant value.
Another critical issue with complex metrics is that they tend to assume a single future climate
scenario, usually based on an optimization performed in an integrated assessment model. The
appropriateness of the resulting metrics under other possible scenarios is unknown, but some
of the gains from complex metrics are likely offset by uncertainties in future conditions.
In between the two extremes of simple and highly complex metrics sits a diverse group
of metrics of intermediate complexity. In terms of their development, these intermediate
metrics find their roots in earlier work on both simple and complex metrics. In some cases,
metrics of intermediate complexity begin as modifications of constant value metrics. For
example, the GTP equation may be modified to evaluate impacts at a fixed point in time as
opposed to a fixed number of years in the future [99]. As a result, the GTP of a greenhouse
gas, and thus the tradeoff between short- and long-lived greenhouse gases, will change over
time as this fixed point in time is approached. In other cases, simplifications can be made
to the integrated assessment models typically used to calculate highly complex metrics.
These changes can result in far simpler metrics - for example, modified metrics might be
based on climate but not economic variables. Interestingly, deriving climate metrics from
these simple and highly complex starting points can yield similar end results, suggesting
that metrics of intermediate complexity may be able to bridge the gap between these two
research communities [53].
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2.2.5 Climate Metrics Going Forward
The results of previous research demonstrate that no climate metric is perfect in all sit-
uations, and that a metric's appropriateness depends on the context in which it is used.
However, many metrics have not been systematically tested, and those that have are typi-
cally evaluated in the context of emissions trading, for instance by evaluating the variation
in climate outcomes if all CO 2 emissions were replaced by another greenhouse gas, a highly
unrealistic scenario. There has been little discussion of how metrics perform in technology
design and evaluation, in spite of the critical role metrics play in these applications. Fur-
thermore, while the benefits and drawbacks of simple and complex metrics are discussed,
the actual gains from complex metrics - given uncertainty about the future - have not been
studied. What is needed is a metric, or set of metrics, that performs well in a realistic context
of use and under uncertainty about future climate, economic, and technology outcomes.
The research presented in this thesis is timely because there have been recent indica-
tions that the policy community is moving to reevaluate current climate metrics. In 2009,
the IPCC hosted an expert meeting to evaluate the state of the specialized knowledge on
climate metrics [83]. Hopefully, this resurgence of interest in metric design and assessment
signals a potential for renewed discussion not only within the climate metrics community
but also among industrial ecologists, practicing engineers, and policymakers. The IPCC has
acknowledged that current metrics are seen as relatively uncontroversial in many of these
broader communities [83], partially because the connection between climate metric choices
and uncertain climate outcomes has not been strongly communicated. This thesis aims to
study this important relationship and provide results that are transparent and salient to the
technology policy community.
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Chapter 3
Methods
Building on the research questions identified in Ch. 1 Introduction and the literature on
(a) energy and transportation and (b) climate metrics and policy reviewed in Ch. 2 Back-
ground, this chapter proposes a method for designing and testing climate metrics. Climate
metrics play a critical but often overlooked role in technology assessment; my approach to
metric design and testing focuses on this technology perspective. I begin with a description
of the data sources on life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of transportation fuels (Sec. 3.1),
then move to a discussion of the climate scenarios used to calculate and evaluate metrics
(Sec. 3.2). In Sec. 3.3, I propose a design for two new metrics: the Cumulative Climate Im-
pact (CCI) and Instantaneous Climate Impact (ICI). I describe how these and other climate
metrics are evaluated in Sec. 3.4.
3.1 Emissions Data
Life cycle emissions were taken from the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and En-
ergy Use in Transportation Model (GREET) Version 2012, published by Argonne National
Laboratory and available at greet.es.anl.gov. Unless otherwise noted, I use default GREET
assumptions for the year 2010 for all fuel pathways: petroleum gasoline, petroleum diesel,
compressed natural gas (CNG); corn and sugar cane ethanol (85% blend), soy and algae
biodiesel (100%), and electricity. For all energy carriers that are not compatible with cur-
rent gasoline and diesel vehicles - including ethanol (at high blending rates), CNG, and
electricity - I assume that fuels are used in dedicated vehicles, as opposed to flexible fuel
vehicles, which avoids penalizing alternative fuels for being used in sub-optimal engines.
However, the impact of vehicle choice on emissions is small. GREET's assumptions are de-
tailed in several technical reports (see [14, 27, 32, 46, 111]). I highlight some of the major
assumptions below, many of which relate to the issues discussed in Sec. 2.1.
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Land Use Change Emissions. Emissions from land use change represent a critical, over-
arching uncertainty for life cycle emissions data. Estimates of these emissions are typically
based on general equilibrium economic models, which can simulate both direct land use
change emissions and indirect emissions from changing market dynamics for biofuel inputs
and other agricultural products [106]. Argonne National Laboratory has created a model to
account for land use change emissions of corn ethanol, but these emissions have not been in-
corporated into the other biofuel pathways in GREET [76]. Since including land use changes
in corn ethanol but not other biofuel emissions can be misleading, I exclude land use change
from my analysis. However, in most cases land use change emissions are primarily C0 2;
thus, generalizations about whether a fuel is CH 4-heavy or CH 4-light hold over a range of
land use change scenarios, with the important exception of fuels that displace peatlands and
wetlands, which carry significant CH 4 emissions.
Fugitive CH 4 Emissions. Algae biofuels and natural gas fuels are particularly important
among the fuels considered here because they are rapidly evolving. With natural gas fuels
like CNG, the rise of unconventional gas has raised questions about how CH 4 emissions from
gas production and transport compare with those of conventional gas. GREET assumes that
fugitive emissions are 6% higher for conventional gas than unconventional gas, although these
estimates are subject to active debate [14]. Algae biofuels, a newly emerging technology, also
emit CH 4 as a product of the growing process, some of which can be captured and burned
to produce energy. GREET assumes "state of the art" facilities with 2% leakage rates [33].
However, whereas processing techniques for established technologies can be estimated with
some certainty (for instance, there is data on the proportion of wet milling and dry milling
for U.S. ethanol production), future algae processing techniques have not been realized and
are thus highly uncertain.
3.2 Climate Scenarios
I use a simple set of equations to create a range of climate scenarios to generate and test
new climate metrics. My reference scenarios are C0 2-only emission scenarios, meaning that
all emissions in the simulation, which begins in 2010, are assumed to be composed entirely
of CO 2 . However, the scenarios are also multi-gas concentration scenarios, meaning that
historical emissions of major non-CO 2 greenhouse gases (e.g. CH 4 and N20) are represented
in the simulation, but emissions of these gases after 2010 are assumed to be zero. I also
include a fixed term for other forcing agents, which is calculated by taking total anthropogenic
radiative forcing in 2010 and subtracting off calculated radiative forcing for C0 2, CH 4 , and
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N2 0.' These CO 2-only emission scenarios represent the hypothetical situation where all
long-lived greenhouse gases are budgeted in terms of a C0 2-equivalent value, with the idea
that a portion of this total can be allocated to non-CO 2 greenhouse gases using a climate
metric. I discuss specific calculations and assumptions for each stage of the simulation below,
beginning with emission pathways and then moving to concentration and radiative forcing
pathways, and finally the selection of reference scenarios (see Fig. 3.1 Part 1).
Emission Pathways. I construct CO 2 emission pathways using an approach modified
from Allen et al. [3]. First, I compute initial emissions eo based on current values, and then
evolve according to
t
e(t) = eo exp Lf g(t')dt , (3.1)
where g(t) is an evolving growth rate.2 For simplicity, initial CO 2 emissions at the start
of the simulation in 2010, eo, are calculated by aggregating C0 2 , CH 4 , and N2 0 emissions
using the GWP, which is consistent with IPCC reporting procedures [102]. Greenhouse
gas emissions in 2010 are taken from estimates from the MESSAGE model, which is pub-
lished by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and available at
lt4ntt.iiasa.ac.at :8743/RcpDb/ (see Tab. 3-1).
Table 3-1: Annual greenhouse gas emissions, rates of change, and C0 2-equivalent values.
CO 2 and C0 2 -equivalent emissions are in units of PgC (or GtC) per year; CH4
and N2 0 emissions are in units of Tg per year.
CO 2 CH 4 N 2 0 Total C0 2-Eq
Emissions in 2005 9.17 339 12.1 12.5
Emissions in 2010 9.97 370 12.8 13.5
Rate of Change 1.8% 1.8% 1.2% 1.7%
Starting from t = 0 (i.e. the year 2010), emissions initially grow at a constant rate go each
year, which is calculated by taking the fractional growth rate in C0 2-equivalent emissions
from C0 2 , CH4 , and N20, and is in fact equal to the 1.7% value recommended by Allen
et al. [3]. Emissions e(t) continue to grow at a constant annual rate go until the year when
emissions reductions begin, ti. In this year, g(t) is reduced by a fixed amount each year
until it reaches the final growth rate gf. Note that since emissions must be reduced below
present values for a mitigation scenario to be possible, gf must be negative. The steepness of
the linear approach from go to gf is determined by the variable t 2, the time when emissions
'These values are taken from the MESSAGE model: https://ttcat .iiasa.a.at:8743/Reptb/.
2 Note that while I describe the model using continuous equations, these equations are implemented in
MATLAB using discrete approximations to the continuous expressions; however, I use sufficiently small time
steps that the effect of this approximation is negligible.
35
mitigation
rate exogenousforcing
target
threshold
forcing
pathway
concentration
pathway
legacy
concentrations
background
concentration
sector budget
concentrations
background
forcing
sector budget
forcing
metric
technology
sector CO2
concentration
sector CH4
concentration
total sector
forcing
Figure 3.1: Schematic of the modeling process for (1) calculating reference climate scenar-
ios and (2) testing (a) emissions decisions and (b) technology decisions. I begin
in Part 1 with two control variables: the mitigation time (ti) and mitigation
rate. These variables define an emission, concentration, and radiative forc-
ing pathway, which are compared to the target threshold; if radiative forcing
does not meet the target, the mitigation rate is adjusted until this condition
is satisfied. The emission pathway then feeds into Part 2 to model emissions
decisions for a given sector, which is allocated a fraction p of total emissions.
Part 2a simulates background (e.g. non-sector) and sector emissions, concentra-
tions, and radiative forcing, deriving a sector budget. Part 2b then simulates
emissions decisions, based on the sector emissions budget, where a metric and
the sector's technology portfolio determine greenhouse gas emissions. The re-
sulting radiative forcing pathway is then compared to the budget calculated in
Part 2a to determine the sector overshoot.
stabilization occurs, or g(t) equals zero. Together, the variables eo, go, gf, ti, and t 2 uniquely
define an emissions pathway. These variables are summarized below (see Fig. 3.2).
" eo: initial emissions, in units of GtC-eq per year.
" go: initial fractional rate of increase in annual emissions, unitless.
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0 g: final (negative) rate of increase in annual emissions, unitless.3
" ti: date when g(t) starts to be reduced.4
" t 2 : date when emissions are stabilized.5
These emission pathways result in a "peak and decline" radiative forcing profile, were radia-
tive forcing initially increases, but as emissions decrease to levels below the rate of removal,
radiative begin to decline. To generate more realistic "stabilization" scenarios, I adjust emis-
sions in the years after peak radiative forcing is reached, such that radiative forcing stabilizes
at a pre-defined level, for example 3 W/m 2 . For the rest of this discussion, I use the adjusted,
stabilization emissions pathway in lieu of the peak and decline pathway.
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Figure 3.2: Scenario variables eo, go, gf, ti, and t 2 can be mapped onto (A.) the emis-
sion rate and (B.) the level of emissions for a given scenario. The adjusted
stabilization emission pathways are shown with black dotted lines.
Concentration Pathways. The concentration, or stock, of a greenhouse gas in the
atmosphere depends on its previous emissions and the rate of removal. In this simulation,
removal functions for greenhouse gases C0 2, CH 4 , and N2 0 are taken from the IPCC's Fourth
Assessment Report and are the same rates used in calculating common climate metrics like
the GWP [102]. These equations do not account for changing removal patterns over time,
for example due to changing concentrations of related compounds or gradual equilibration
among sources and sinks (see Tab. 3-2 for parameter values). For CH 4 and N20, a simple
exponential decay function is used (see Fig. 3.3 A.):
fm(t, t') = - -M (3.2)
3 Allen et al. recommend a rate no faster than -0.1, which is the value I use in my simulation [3].
4Allen et al. suggest a range from 2010 to 2050 for a maximum temperature change of 2'C [3].
5 Allen et al. suggest a range from 5 to 25 years after ti [3].
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t- t
where M and N subscripts denote items related to CH 4 and N20, respectively, and fi(t, t')
gives the fraction of a generic greenhouse gas i, emitted at time t', remaining in the atmo-
sphere at time t. CH 4 is removed from the atmosphere through reactions with OH~, which
take place in the troposphere and stratosphere, with a minority of removal also due to re-
actions with Cl- and 0- in the stratosphere and removal by soils [102]. N20 is removed
from the atmosphere primarily by photodissociation in the stratosphere, with a minority of
removal due to reactions with 0-, which also take place in the stratosphere [102]. For C0 2 ,
the IPCC uses a series of exponential decay functions, based on an impulse response function
derived from the Bern Carbon Cycle Model (see Fig. 3.3 A.)[54]:
t-ti t-t/ t-t/fK(t,t)=ao+al 'e ± a2 - + r -a 3 ' 3 , (3.4)
where K subscripts denote items relate to CO 2 and fi(t, t') is defined as previously. While
this function provides an adequate approximation of CO 2 decay, it ignores key non-linearities
in the carbon cycle. The main processes removing CO 2 from the atmosphere are uptake by
plants and the ocean.
Table 3-2: Parameter values for concentration calculations (see Eqs. 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4).
Parameter Value
TM 12 years
TN 114 years
ao 0.217 (unitless)
ai 0.259 (unitless)
a 2  0.338 (unitless)
a3  0.186 (unitless)
r1 172.9 years
T2 18.51 years
73 1.186 years
For CH 4 and N20, the removal functions do not depend when emissions occur (see Eqs. 3.2
and 3.3). Thus, contributions to concentrations from historical (i.e. before 2010) emissions
can simply be added to the total stock of CH4 or N20, and their removal can be calculated in
the same way as for new emissions. I call these contributions to greenhouse gas concentrations
legacy concentrations. For C0 2 , since removal does not follow a single exponential decay (see
Eq. 3.4), calculating legacy concentrations is more complicated. I use historical emissions for
years prior to 2005 and projected emissions from the MESSAGE model for the years 2006
to 2010, both also published by HASA, to calculate expected CO 2 concentrations in 2010
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(see Eq. 3.4). Next, I adjust calculated 2010 CO 2 concentrations to equal the value provided
by MESSAGE, and carry this linear correction factor through all subsequent calculations of
legacy CO 2 concentrations (see Fig. 3.3 B.). Thus, the scenarios include four contributions to
greenhouse gas concentrations: for CO 2, both legacy concentrations and concentrations due
to emissions after 2010 (see Fig. 3.3 C.), and for CH4 and N2 0, only legacy concentrations,
since emissions after 2010 are budgeted in terms of CO 2 (see Fig. 3.3 D.).
CO2
CH4
N20
A.
2040 2070 2100
Year
to 1
.C
-FU 0.8
E
62 0.6
-0.4
0
5 0.2
-0L.L
2010
600
E
0
2~00
0
2 200
UC
0
0
2010
-400
- 370
0
T340
C
310
280
1850
I Correction
Data
Model t <0
Modelt>0
B.
1950
Year
1800
-a
Legacy C02 0 20
(U
C
0
U
0
2050
Legacy CH4
- Legacy N2 0
D.
2010 2040 2070 2100
Year
Figure 3.3: (A.) CO 2, CH4 , and N20 have different removal rates fi(t, t'), plotted here for
t' - 2010 (see Eqs. 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4). These removal rates govern how quickly
legacy greenhouse gas concentrations are removed from the atmosphere, with
(B.) legacy CO 2 requiring a correction to account for the timing of emissions
(described in the text). (C.) Total CO 2 concentrations are equal to the sum
of legacy concentrations and the concentrations due to new emissins, whereas
(D.) CH 4 and N20 concentrations contain only legacy contributions.
Radiative Forcing Pathways. There are two approaches to calculating the radiative
forcing of greenhouse gases from their concentrations. The first is a set of functions developed
by the IPCC based on an empirical fit to model results [42]. Using these functions, RFK(cK),
the radiative forcing of a given concentration of CK of C0 2 , RFM(cM) for CH 4, and RFN(CN)
for N20, are approximately given by
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RFK(CK) = C (nCK (t) - lncK(to)) (3.5)
RFM(CM) - aM [CM(t) - CM(to)] - OMN(CM(t)) (3-6)
RFN(CN) aN [ CM(t) - CM(tO)] OMN(CN(t)), (3.7)
where ac, aM, and aN are constants and CK(tO), CM(to), and CN(to) are pre-industrial con-
centrations (see Tab. 3-3 for values). The terms OMN(CM) and OMN(CN) account for the
overlap in the absorption spectra of methane and nitrous oxide and are given by
OMN(CM) =h(cM(t),C N(to)) - h(cM(to), CN(to)) (3.8)
OMN(CN) =h(cM(to), CN(t)) - h(cM(to),CN(tO)) (3.9)
h(cM, CN) i 1 'n [1 + C2 ' (CMCN)"e + C3 ' CM(CMCN)e2] (3.10)
with constants c 1 , C2 , C3 61, e 2 , CM(to), and CN(to) also given in Tab. 3-3.
The second option, typically used for small perturbations in greenhouse gas concen-
trations, is to use a linear approximation Eqs. 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. Using these functions
LRFK(CK), the linearized radiative forcing of C0 2 , and LRFM(CM), the linearized radiative
forcing of CH 4 are given by
LRFK(CK)= AK (CK(t) - CK(0)) + RFK(CK(0)) (3.11)
LRFM(CM) = AM(cM(t) - CM(0)) + RFM(CM(0)), (3.12)
where AK and AM are the radiative efficiency of CO 2 and CH 4 , constants calculated by
taking the derivative of Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6 and evaluating it at a reference time t = 0 (e.g. the
year 2010).6 Thus, AK and AM are
AK aK (3.13)
CK(0)
AM 2 aM 6 OMN (CM(0))- (3.14)
2 CM(0) 6CM
The error associated with this approximation is initially small but grows as greenhouse gas
concentrations change.7 Conventionally, this approximation is used to calculate the GWP
6The derivation for LRFN(CN) is analogous to that for LRFM(cM) and is therefore omitted from this
discussion for simplicity.
7Note that this error overestimates radiative forcing per unit CO 2 in the C0 2-only emission scenarios,
since CO 2 concentrations increase above present values, whereas it underestimates the radiative forcing per
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Table 3-3: Parameter values for radiative forcing calculations (see text for equations).
Parameter Value
aK 5.35 W/m 2
CK(to) 278 ppm
am 0.0036 W/m 2 - ppb-2
CM(to) 700 ppb
ci 0.47 W/m 2
C2 2.01-10-5 (unitless)
C3 5.31- 10~-5 (unitless)
ei 0.75 (unitless)
e 2 1.52 (unitless)
and other simple climate metrics (e.g. Eqs. 3.13 and 3.14). I also use this approximation to
calculate radiative forcing in my simple climate model. Although this approach may be less
accurate than using the full radiative forcing functions, it allows me to isolate the effects
of metric design on climate outcomes, without introducing differences in the metric's and
model's methods for calculating radiative forcing.8
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Radiative forcing contributions of C0 2 , CH 4 , N20, and other forcings, shown
(A.) as raw values and (B.) as a progressive sum, where we begin with the
radiative forcing contribution from other forcings, then sequentially add the
contributions from C0 2, CH 4 , and N2 0, with the end value being the total
radiative forcing from all sources modeled in this analysis.
Scenario Selection. I define a family of scenarios as a set of radiative forcing pathways
that stabilize at the same threshold but approach this threshold at different rates. I focus
on a 3 W/m 2 threshold, since this level of radiative forcing in equilibrium is associated
unit of CH4 and N 20, since CH 4 and N2 0 concentrations decline in these scenarios.
8 A factor of 1.4 is also typically multiplied to the radiative forcing of CH 4 to account for the indirect effects
of CH4 on its own concentration and the concentrations of other forcing agents. I adopt this convention
here, adjusting the fixed radiative forcing term to avoid double-counting radiative forcing contributions.
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with a global average surface temperature increase of 2*C, a commonly-cited policy target.
Different scenarios within a scenario family are defined based on their values of ti, the year
when emissions reductions begin. Given values for eo, go, g1 , and t1 , we can calculate the
value of t2 that results in a scenario that just touches, but does not exceed, the 3 W/m 2
threshold. Earlier values of ti result in gradual emissions reduction scenarios, whereas later
values of ti result in delayed emissions reduction scenarios followed by rapid reductions.
For any given radiative forcing threshold, there is a maximum value of ti above which it is
impossible to stay below the threshold. I bound my family of emission scenarios with this
ti value as the upper bound and use the year 2010 as the lower bound (see Fig. 3.5).
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Figure 3.5: Scenarios within a scenario family vary in terms of (A.) the multiplicative
rate of change in emissions, (B.) the CO 2 emission pathway, (C.) the CO 2
concentration pathway, and (D.) the radiative forcing pathway. Colored lines
show un-adjusted emissions, concentrations, and radiative forcing, and black
dashed lines show these values after they are adjusted to create a radiative
forcing stabilization scenario, as described in the text.
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3.3 Metric Design
A climate metric converts emissions e of one type of greenhouse gas into units of another
gas, typically CO 2 , so that different gases can be compared on a single scale. The following
equation illustrates the use of a generic metric p to convert emissions of two greenhouse
gases, CH4 and N2 0, into C0 2-equivalent emissions:
etota = eco2 + eCa 4 -PCH 4 + eN20 'tN 2 0. (3.15)
In this discussion, I focus on comparing CO 2 and Ci 4 because these two gases are the largest
human contributors to climate change and because they have significantly different lifetimes,
which makes comparisons more interesting. However, this approach can easily be extended to
N2 0 and other greenhouse gases of intermediate complexity.' Climate policies often project
or budget a trajectory for total, C0 2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions eettj, with the idea
that one can then use a metric to allocate a portion of etota to individual gases. However,
greenhouse gases display different radiative forcing dynamics that may not be reflected in
the metric. As a result, the actual radiative forcing pathway may differ from the intended
pathway, possibly leading to unanticipated and undesired climate impacts.
I propose and investigate two metrics, the cumulative climate impact (CCI), which in-
tegrates radiative forcing up to a given year, and the instantaneous climate impact (ICI),
which calculates radiative forcing in a given year [25]. I call this year the stabilization year,
t,, which is defined for each reference climate scenario as the year when radiative forcing
first reaches, and subsequently stabilizes at, the threshold value. Unlike the GWP, which is
calculated using time horizon r that remains constant over time, the CCI and ICI change
depending on the timing of greenhouse gas emissions and the proximity to t,. The value
of t8, itself, also varies depending on the radiative forcing threshold (which defines the sce-
nario family) and the individual radiative forcing scenario (specifically, the value of t1 ). In
summary, the GWP, CCI, and ICI are defined for CH 4 as follows:
GWP - fJ'RF (CH 4) dt (3.16)fo RF (CO 2) dt
CCI (t) =f RE (GH 4) dt (3.17)ft RF (CO 2 ) dt
ICI (t) =R (Gi 4 ) (3.18)RE (GO 2 ) a
'Some greenhouse gases have very complex, spatially diverse concentration patterns, which make them
less amenable to the numerical simplifications commonly used to analyze CO2 , CH4, and N2 0.
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We can rewrite these equations more explicitly in terms of the linear radiative forcing
equations from Sec. 3.2. The change in radiative forcing due to a perturbation in the con-
centration of a generic greenhouse gas i, Ac,, is approximately equal to
Radiative Forcing ~ LRFj(c, + Ac,) - LRFj(ci). (3.19)
If Aci is equal to one unit, and its removal is described by fi(t, t') (e.g. Eqs. 3.2, 3.3, 3.4),
then Eq. 3.19 is equal to
Radiative Forcing ~ Aifi(t, t'), (3.20)
and the GWP, CCI, and ICI for CH 4 , using CO 2 as the reference gas, can be written as
f0 Aufm(t', O)dt' (3.21)
CCI (t, t) I fG AMfM(t', t)dt' (3.22)
ftt AKfK(t' , t)dt'
ICI (t, t.) - Am fm(tt) (3.23)
AKfKt,t)'
where the dependence of the GWP, CCI, and ICI on various time variables is explicitly
noted, and the values of AK and AM are given in Eqs. 3.13 and 3.14.
3.4 Metric Testing
Previous assessments of the performance of climate metrics are surprisingly limited. Re-
search efforts are more focused on creating new metrics, resulting in a dizzying array of
metric proposals but a general lack of synthesis. One possible reason for the scarcity of
metric evaluation and testing is that the criteria for assessing metric performance are not
well-defined [77]. The tests that have been performed focus on highly-stylized scenarios -
for example, by calculating the difference in a radiative forcing if all CO 2 emissions were
suddenly replaced with a C0 2-equivalent amount of some other gas, typically CH 4 , where
CO 2 equivalence is determined using the metric being tested [18]. While it may be useful
for demonstrating the challenges inherent in single-basket emissions trading, this extreme
scenario is highly unrealistic: greenhouse gas emissions are not abstract entities but rather
the result of tangible technology choices made by actors in many different decision-making
environments.
I argue that climate metric evaluations would be more informative if they captured a
reasonable, but not excessive, variation in potential technology outcomes. I test the perfor-
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mance of climate metrics using the following thought experiment as a guide (see also Fig. 3.1
Part 2). Suppose policymakers have projected or budgeted a trajectory e(t) for total C0 2 -
equivalent emissions, using the approach described in Section 3.2. Assume for simplicity
that there are just two kinds of greenhouse gases, CH 4 and C0 2 , with emissions eM(t) and
eK(t), and radiative forcing due to all other factors is encompassed in a single term, RFA.10
Given some equivalency metric p(t), the sum of CO 2 and CH 4 emissions must equal the
total budgeted C0 2-equivalent emissions: eK(t) + p(t)eM(t) = e(t). If we assume a constant
fraction q of emissions are budgeted for CH4 , then eK(t) and em(t) are
eK(t) = (1 - q)e(t) (3.24)
eM(t) qe(t) (3.25)
Using the notation for greenhouse gas removal introduced in Section 3.3 (Eqs. 3.2, 3.3, 3.4),
the concentration of a gas i due to emissions and removal can be modeled as
ci(t) =e (to) + J fi(t, t') ei(t') dt', (3.26)
Jt
where to is a pre-industrial reference time. The integral in Eq. 3.26 can be divided into
two periods: before the present and after the present, where the present is again defined
as the year 2010. Emissions before the present are unaffected by the metric pL but need to
be included because they have an enduring, time-dependent contribution to future radiative
forcing. Emissions in the second integral occur in the future and are affected by t as well as
the constructed emission pathway e(t). Letting t = 0 be the present and ci(to) denote the
pre-industrial concentration, we have
ci(t ) ci(to) +] fi(t, t') ei(t') dt' +] fi(t, t') e(t') dt' (3.27)
ft
- c(to) + ciL(t) + J fi(t, t') ei(t') dt', (3.28)
where cL(t) denotes the time-dependent legacy effects of historical emissions. Thus we have
CO 2 and CH4 concentration paths given by
i'Note that this approach can also be easily translated to include other greenhouse gases of intermediate
complexity, such as N20, which I explicitly model for all the results presented in Ch. 4.
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CK(t) CK(tO) + CKL(t) + 0 fK (t, tK ) eK(t')dt'
CK(tO) + CKL(t) + (1 - q) j fK(t, t') e) dt' (3.29)
ItCM(t) CM(tO) + CML(t) + j (t I') eM(t') dt!
CM(tO) + CML(t) + q (t t')(330)
JO ~~/Lt) t.(30
Using Eqs. 3.11 and 3.12, we can write the total radiative forcing due to the evolving con-
centrations of CO 2 and CH 4 as
RF(t) = LRFK(CK(t)) + LRFM(cM(t)) + RFA(t)
= AK [CK(t) - CK(O)] + RFK(CK(O) + Am [CM(t) ~ CM(0)]
+ RFM(CM(0)) + RFA(t), (3.31)
Eq. 3.31 can be used to test how emissions decisions made using an arbitrary metric, P(t),
compare to intended climate outcomes.
The approach to testing technology decisions is analogous to that for testing emissions
decisions. Suppose again that policymakers have projected or budgeted a trajectory e(t) for
C0 2-equivalent emissions, and that a fraction p of these emissions is allocated to a given
technology sector, for example the U.S. passenger vehicle transportation sector." Assume
we have a single representative transportation fuel with emissions intensity 7 (in units of
grams C0 2-equivalent per mile) defined by
n(t) = nK + nM ' p(t), (3.32)
where /K and nM are the CO 2 and CH 4 emissions intensity, meaning that 7M - A(t) is CH4
emissions intensity in grams C0 2 -equivalent per mile. The maximum number of miles d that
can be driven using the fuel without exceeding the sector's emissions budget are
d = p - e(t) (3.33)
"I calculate p for this sector by assuming that 24% of global emissions come from the transportation
sector, 75% of which are from ground transportation, and 60-70% of which are from passenger vehicles [12].
The U.S. comprises approximately one quarter of global emissions, giving a range for p of 2.7-3.2%.
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and the actual emissions of each gas for the sector are
eKs = d- TIK
eMs = d - 'iM.
(3.34)
(3.35)
Using these equations, total global emissions are given below, assuming that emissions from
other sectors are composed entirely of CO 2 .
eK =(I ~-p) -e~t)+ieKs, -- -p) -e~t + P- TIK e
r7(t)
JiMeM-=eMs p' ert)
r/(t)
(3.36)
(3.37)
Based on these emissions, concentration pathways for CO 2 and CH 4 are given by
CK() = CK(to) + CKL(t) + jt fK(t, t') eK(t') dt'
ftCK(tO) ± CKL)
CM(t) CM(t0) ± CML t ±
CM(tO) + CMLt +
Ktt') ( -p) -e(t') +P p t )e(t')
I t
J' t
fM(t, t') eM(t) dt'
dt',
-0.5
0.4
Background 0.3
Total 0.2
-Threshold
A.
2100
Figure 3.6: (A.) Contributions to global radiative forcing consist of forcing from legacy
concentrations and concentrations due to new, non-sector emissions (collec-
tively termed background radiative forcing). (B.) The difference between the
global radiative forcing budget and the background radiative forcing pathway
is the sector radiative forcing budget.
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dt' (3.38)
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and total radiative forcing is equal to
TRF(t) =AK [CK(tO) + cKL(t) + t fK(t, t')[ '(t)K I dt - CK(O)L tJo L - r(t') J
+ Am cM(to) + cuL(t ) -+ fm (tt' p - e(t') dt' - cm (0)
+ RFK(CK(O))+ RFM(cM(0)) + RFA(t). (3.40)
Note that while the global radiative forcing budget stabilizes at 3 W/m 2 , the budget for the
sector does not necessarily stabilize, due the fact that legacy radiative forcing continues to
decline after the stabilization threshold is reached (see Fig. 3.6).
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Chapter 4
Results
This chapter presents the results of applying the approach described in Ch. 3 Methods to
design and test climate metrics for technology evaluation. In Sec. 4.1, I introduce a system
for classifying metrics based on their level of complexity and information requirements, and
identify three classes of metrics: simple static, simple dynamic, and complex dynamic. In
Sec. 4.2 and Sec. 4.3, I present insights on simple static and complex dynamic metrics,
which I use to design and test a new pair of simple dynamic metrics, introduced in Ch. 3
Methods and assessed in detail in Sec. 4.4. For each metric, I focus on two overarching
questions: (a) does this metric give us the information we need to evaluated energy tech-
nologies? and (b) do decisions made using this metric lead to intended climate outcomes? I
explore the nuances of these questions using alternative transportation fuels as a case study.
My results suggest that simple dynamic metrics show great promise to improve technol-
ogy evaluations for climate change mitigation. In Ch. 5 Discussion, I examine how these
metrics could be incorporated into climate and technology policy.
4.1 Classifying Climate Metrics
Here I propose a new approach to classifying metrics based on two dimensions: metric com-
plexity and information requirements [24]. As discussed in Ch. 2, the complexity of current
climate metrics and popular alternative proposals varies widely, ranging from a constant
value to a vector of detailed output from an integrated assessment model. Current discus-
sions in the climate metrics community focus on the tradeoff between metric simplicity (which
is assumed to correlate with ease of use) on the one hand and the ability to capture complex,
changing tradeoffs between greenhouse gases (which is assumed to correlate with improved
accuracy) on the other hand. However, these assessments tend to be one-dimensional and
extremely high-level, failing for instance to capture the diversity of potential metric users and
their different levels of comfort with complex metrics, and the relationship between metric
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complexity and actual climate outcomes. I explore this issue by expanding the comparison
of simple and complex metrics to include a second axis, information availability.
While metric complexity is often discussed in the literature (e.g. [77]), the amount of
information required to calculate different types of metrics is often not explicitly assessed.
Simple physical metrics like the GWP and GTP require information about the current state
of the climate system,' while simple economic metrics require additional information about
the state of the economic system.2 In general, these simple metrics do not require information
about future climate or economic variables. However, the free parameters in these metrics
(e.g. the time horizon, time of evaluation, or discount rate) may be implicitly informed
by assumptions about future climate or economic conditions. In contrast to these simple
metrics, highly complex metrics typically assume perfect information about future climate
and economic variables, through a single optimized simulation performed in an integrated
assessment model. In reality, neither of these two extremes characterizes our actual state of
knowledge. While we cannot have perfect information about the future, we do have some
information that can improve the design of climate metrics.
The appropriate level of climate metric complexity - whether they are used for emissions
trading, technology evaluation, or both - depends on the amount of information available
about the future state of the climate and economic system. At one extreme, if no information
is known (or assumed) about the future, it is impossible to calculate complex metrics, since
these metrics depend on information about the future of climate and economic variables.
Conversely, if complete information is known about the future, then these metrics can be
easily calculated; in this case, a constant-value metric could still be used instead, but this
approach would be highly inefficient because it would be ignoring available information.
Guided by this understanding of the relationship between metric complexity and information
requirements, I identify optimal and feasible combinations of these attributes (see Fig. 4.1).
I apply this framework to analyze three classes of metrics: simple static, simple dynamic,
and complex dynamic, beginning with an assessment of simple static and complex dynamic
metrics before proposing and evaluating a new pair of simple dynamic metrics. I argue that,
given limited information about the future, simple dynamic metrics can improve on simple
static metrics while being more flexible and realistic than complex dynamic metrics.
'Simple physical metrics use information about current removal rates of greenhouse gases, their con-
centrations, radiative efficiencies (radiative forcing per unit gas), and in the case of the GTP, temperature
sensitivity. These values change over time, and in theory simple metrics could be updated to reflect expected
future changes. However, in practice, either current or historical values are used.
2 1n addition to the information required for simple physical metrics, simple economic metrics require
information about the relationship between climate changes and climate damages.
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual illustration of the possible combinations of metric complexity and
information availability. The information available (or assumed to be available)
must be greater or equal to the amount of information incorporated into the
metric, thus defining a region of feasible metrics. I divide metrics into three
broad categories: simple static, simple dynamic, and complex dynamic.
4.2 Simple Static Metrics
The Global Warming Potential. I begin with a case study of the Global Warming
Potential (GWP) as a simple static metric. The GWP is interesting both because it has re-
ceived extensive use in emissions trading policies and policy-relevant technology assessments,
and because it illustrates many of the inherent limitations of static metrics. As introduced
in Ch. 2, the GWP takes the following form:
fRF (GHG) dt
GWP (GHG) = r (4.1)
f'R F(CO2) dt'
where RF (GHG) represents the radiative forcing of a unit emission of a greenhouse gas at
time zero, as it is removed from the atmosphere over time. The GWP is typically evaluated
over a 100 year time horizon, although alternative time horizons have also been proposed,
the most popular of which is a 20 year time horizon. Comparisons of the climate impacts
of high-CH 4 and low-CH4 technologies vary widely depending on the choice of time horizon
(see Fig. 4.2). Here I examine this phenomenon in detail.
Suppose for example that we would like to understand the climate impact of replacing
a significant portion of the U.S. vehicle fleet, currently supplied by gasoline, with natural
gas (e.g. CNG). What are the expected climate impacts of this substitution? Using a time
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horizon of 100 years, CNG provides a slight climate benefit over gasoline. However, using
a time horizon of 20 years, the picture looks very different. The impact of CNG far exceed
those of gasoline. A similar story applies to other technologies; for instance, tradeoffs between
CH 4-heavy algae biodiesel and C0 2 -heavy corn ethanol change vary dramatically with the
choice of time horizon. These results also have implications for assessing innovation priorities
within a single technology. Algae biodiesel emits high amounts of CH 4 during its life cycle
but also has an energy-intensive production process, which has the potential to be highly
C0 2 -intensive. The benefits of improved energy efficiency versus enhanced CH 4 capture
depend on the relative impacts of CO 2 and CH 4, which for the GWP is driven by the choice
of a static, arbitrary time horizon.
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Figure 4.2: Transportation fuels emit a variety of gases during their life cycles, and these
gases have different heat trapping abilities and removal rates. Although these
dynamics are not reflected in static metrics like the GWP, they explain why
the relative climate impacts of fuels look very different when are evaluated (A.)
over the most common time horizon, 100 years, versus (B.) over a time horizon
of 20 years, a commonly-discussed alternative. Neither of these options shows
the full, time-dependent impact of technology choices, such as (C.) gasoline
versus CNG or (D.) corn ethanol versus algae biodiesel.
Not only does the GWP fail to provide meaningful answers to critical technology evalu-
ation questions, but it can also lead to technology choices that are inconsistent with climate
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change mitigation goals. Consider the following case: what if the U.S. enacted a policy to
replace gasoline with CNG for passenger vehicles? Using the the typical GWP (100 year
time horizon), we would expect this choice to slightly reduce the climate impacts of the
U.S. passenger vehicle fleet. However, when we observe the actual climate impact of this
policy, assuming for simplicity that energy demand stays at current levels, we see that these
impacts are different than GWP projections suggest (Fig. 4.3 A.). While this discrepancy
is relatively small for gasoline, which emits primarily C0 2 , it is much more substantial for
CNG, which emits significant amounts of CH 4. In fact, when examining the actual radiative
forcing of these two technology choices, CNG leads to higher forcing values through the
year 2077. A similar pattern is observed for the hypothetical situation where U.S. passenger
vehicle energy demand is supplied by corn ethanol or algae biodiesel, with the error being
much higher for algae biodiesel due to its high CH 4 emissions (Fig. 4.3 B.).
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(A.) The projected climate impacts of satisfying constant U.S. passenger vehi-
cle energy demand with gasoline and CNG using the GWP differ from actual
impacts, with the discrepancy being more significant for the CNG due to its
higher CH 4 content. (B.) The same pattern is observed for the planning sce-
nario using corn ethanol and algae biodiesel, with again the discrepancy being
higher for the high-CH 4 algae fuels.
If these types of technology planning errors, created by using the GWP to assess tech-
nology climate impacts, are perpetuated over a number of decisions, then these decisions
in aggregate could lead to a significant overshoot of intended climate thresholds. To under-
stand the magnitude of the potential error, I simulate a hypothetical policy where 5% of CO 2
emissions are replaced with CH 4 , where the GWP (with a 100 year time horizon) is used to
calculate the equivalent amount of CH4 (see Fig. 4.4). I use two scenarios - an early mitiga-
tion/late stabilization year scenario and a late mitigation/early stabilization year scenario -
which together represent a reasonable bound on scenarios where a 3 W/m 2 threshold can be
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maintained. Using the GWP for emissions planning in this example causes the threshold to
be surpassed, by approximately 2-4% depending on the scenario. If instead CH 4 emissions
were maintained at their current value of 19% of global emissions (on a GWP equivalence
basis), this error could reach 11-17%, again depending on the scenario.
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Figure 4.4: On an economy-wide scale, making emissions decisions using the GWP can
result in a significant overshoot of climate targets, for both (A.) a late sta-
bilization year and (B.) an early stabilization year. I model a hypothetical
situation where 5% of the total budgeted C0 2-equivalent emissions are allo-
cated to CH 4 , where the appropriate amount of CH 4 to emit is calculated using
the GWP (with a 100 year time horizon). The actual radiative forcing trajec-
tory resulting from this policy differs from the intended trajectory, which is
calculated assuming all GHG emissions are CO 2.
While the error associated with using the GWP has been noted in previous research [183,
this error has not been systematically analyzed across different emission scenarios or levels
of metric adoption, nor has it been related to technology evaluation. My results suggest that
the magnitude of the error introduced by using a metric like the GWP changes depending
on the climate scenario, with steeper radiative forcing pathways (i.e. late mitigation, early
stabilization year) having a higher magnitude of error than shallow radiative forcing path-
ways (i.e. early mitigation, late stabilization year). However, regardless of the exact radiative
forcing pathway, we see that the GWP undervalues the climate impacts of CH 4 emissions
relative to CO 2 overall, with this undervaluing being most extreme close to the stabilization
year. The increasing prevalence of high-CH 4 alternative energy technologies, including natu-
ral gas and algae biofuels as well as other technologies, also suggests that the aggregate error
resulting from using the GWP to make technology decisions may be larger than previously
assumed [36].
Other Static Climate Metrics. The most popular alternative to the GWP, the GTP,
is also a static metric. It compares the temperature change AT a given number of years
T after a pulse emission of a gas (for example, CH4 ) to the temperature change from an
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equal sized pulse of C0 2 , where the temperature change is a function of radiative forcing
but experiences some delay due to the thermal inertia of the ocean [34]. As introduced in
Ch. 2, the GTP takes the following form:
GTP (GHG) =AT [R (GHG)] (4.2)
AT [RF (CO2 )
The issue of timing is also critical for the GTP, since a single point in time must be selected for
comparing temperature impacts of greenhouse gases, and hence energy technologies. Fig. 4.2
illustrates how the radiative forcing (and thus, approximately, the eventual temperature
impact) of using (C.) gasoline versus CNG and (D.) corn ethanol versus algae biodiesel
decays over time as gases are removed from the atmosphere. Depending on the point in
time selected, comparisons of these fuels can look very different. As a result, as with the
GWP, the GTP is ill-suited to answer questions about the temporal dynamics of energy
technologies.
Other metrics, for example the simple economic metrics discussed in Ch. 2, suffer from
similar challenges. Since impacts in early years are valued more highly, relative to impacts
in later years, under a high discount rate as compared to a low discount rate, shorter-lived
greenhouse gases like CH 4 appear more significant under a high discount rate and long-
lived greenhouse gases like CO 2 appear more significant under a low discount rate. Again,
the choice of a somewhat arbitrary parameter - in this case this discount rate - can change
comparisons of greenhouse gases and technologies. Fundamentally, these results suggest that
all static metrics suffer from the same basic limitation: since the contribution of emissions
of different greenhouse gases to radiative forcing changes over time, and the importance of a
marginal contribution to radiative forcing increases as climate thresholds are approached, no
static metric can appropriately characterize the dynamic trade-offs among greenhouse gases
over time. This idea that a control must be sufficiently complex to reflect the complexity of
the system being controlled has been discussed in other contexts [6, 38], but has not been
acknowledged explicitly in the climate metrics community.
Some metrics, like the GWP, lead to climate change trajectories that exceed climate
thresholds, whether they are used for technology evaluation or emissions trading. Other
static metrics may not lead to an overshoot, if non-CO 2 greenhouse gases are valued at a
sufficiently high level relative to CO 2 . However, these metrics would be highly inefficient,
leading to very low allowed emissions of shorter-lived greenhouse gases, particularly early on
when these emissions would have time to decay before critical climate thresholds are reached.
Since a static metric must somehow balance the low impacts of shorter-lived greenhouse gases
early on with the high impacts of these gases close to climate thresholds, it must either result
in an overshoot of climate targets or a lost opportunity to emit non-CO 2 greenhouse gases
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(which, since emissions are tied to economic activity, suggests an unnecessary restriction
on economic growth). The inherent limitations of static metrics have motivated researchers
to consider metrics that change over time, with some of the earliest proposals being the
complex, dynamic metrics discussed in the next section.
4.3 Complex Dynamic Metrics
The limitations of the GWP lead early researchers to propose two alternative metrics: the
Global Damage Potential (GDP) and the Global Cost Potential (GCP) [55, 67]. The GDP
and GCP fall from two general formulations of the climate change mitigation problem. The
first (corresponding to the GDP) is a cost/benefit formulation, where the problem is posed
as one of balancing the benefits of avoided climate damages with the costs of mitigation over
time. The second (corresponding to the GCP) is a cost-effectiveness formulation, where a
specific physical constraint or target is set, for example a 2*C temperature threshold, and
economic decisions are optimized to meet this target in the most efficient manner. Thus, the
GDP establishes equivalence between greenhouse gases in terms of their climate damages over
time in a cost/benefit mitigation framework. As is the case for simple static metrics, the issue
of timing is critical for complex dynamic metrics - here, it is most often introduced through
the selection of the discount rate and time period of analysis. Similarly, the GCP establishes
equivalence between gases in terms of their contributions to some climate constraint. The
constraint is typically physically-based, either in terms of radiative forcing or temperature.
Typically, either magnitudes or rates of change are constrained, although in theory other
formulations could also be adopted.
While in principle the GWP and GTP can be seen as simplifications of the GDP and
GCP, respectively, in practice these two sets of metrics were developed separately. In general,
the GDP and GCP require more information than do the GWP, GTP, and other simple
static metrics. In their most complex form, the GDP and GCP require information about
the changing costs of climate change over time, as well as the evolution of climate system
variables. In contrast, the GWP and GTP typically assume constant, historical values for
the climate system and make no explicit assumptions about economic variables. Recent
literature suggests that all metrics can be viewed as simplifications of the GDP metric,
where the GCP essentially assumes that climate damages are zero below the threshold and
infinite above it, and the GWP and GTP make the simplifying assumption that damages
are linearly related to certain physical parameters and that the costs of mitigating different
greenhouse gases are equal [108]. However, in practice, the process of calculating simple,
constant metrics like the GWP and GTP and complex, dynamic metrics like the GDP and
GCP vary greatly.
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GDP and GCP metrics are typically calculated using integrated assessment models or
other relatively complex models of the evolution of global climate and economic systems. The
results of these models can be difficult to interpret, particularly because it is difficult for the
large number of inputs and assumptions to be transparent to other researchers, technology
evaluation experts, policymakers, or the general public. In addition, it is uncertain whether
the resulting climate metrics (or relative prices of greenhouse gases) will in fact lead to
technology choices that are consistent with climate goals. If all emissions decisions were
made by disaggregated actors performing consistent, individualized optimizations, theory
suggests that these decisions would lead to the same emissions decisions as predicted by a
globally-aggregated integrated assessment model [34]. However, in reality emissions decisions
- as with other decisions in complex sociotechnical systems - are not made using these
optimization procedures. In these more realistic "sub-optimal" cases, there is no guarantee
that climate metrics calculated using integrated assessment models will lead to intended
climate outcomes.
Complex dynamic metrics also do not give a consistent answer to simple questions such as:
how does the relative impact of an emission of CH4 versus CO 2 change over time? Using the
GCP metrics, the price of CH4 emissions relative to CO 2 emissions increases as thresholds
are approached if an absolute temperature constraint is used. When a constraint on the
rate of temperature change is introduced, the price of CH 4 tends to be higher early on, as
compared to the absolute temperature constraint case. However, GDP metrics based on a
cost/benefit rather than a cost-effectiveness picture give less clear price tradeoffs over time. It
is difficult extract generalizable conclusions about the tradeoffs between CH 4 and CO 2 using
these models. Given the complexity and lack of transparency of the GDP and GCP metrics,
combined with their focus on abstract, optimized emissions decisions, a new approach to
comparing greenhouse gases is needed for technology assessment. While this approach could
be interpreted as a development of the GWP and GTP metrics or a simplification of the GDP
and GCP metrics, it also must make a departure from these metrics, both by recognizing
the uncertainty inherent in the climate metrics problem and the importance of metrics for
technology evaluation.
4.4 Simple Dynamic Metrics
4.4.1 Metric Design
Given that neither simple static nor complex dynamic metrics meet the needs of technology
evaluation, how can this be done better? In Ch. 3, I proposed two simple dynamic climate
metrics: the CCI, which integrates radiative forcing up to a given year, and the ICI, which
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Figure 4.5: I use information about the range of possible scenarios consistent with a 3
W/m 2 stabilization target to anchor climate metrics to the changing climate
system. (A.) The emission scenarios consistent with this threshold range from
a early emissions reduction scenario (Scenario A) to a late reduction scenario
(Scenario E), with more gradual reduction scenarios having later stabilization
years. (B.) I compute the impact of CH 4 , in units of C0 2-equivalent impact,
under the ICI, CCI, and GWP, using Scenarios A and E as two examples
representing the range of possible values consistent with the 3 W/m 2 threshold.
calculates radiative forcing in a given year, where the year of evaluation is anchored to
a specific feature of the climate system - here, 3 W/m 2 radiative forcing threshold. The
formulation of these metrics parallels that of the GWP and GTP, but unlike these simple
static metrics, the CCI and ICI change over time in response to changing climate constraints.
As introduced in Ch. 3, the CCI and ICI take the have form:
ft  ' RF (CH 4 ) dt
ft " RF (CO2) dt
(4.3)
ICI (t) =RF (C 4) (4.4)RF(C0 2) &
For example, if the stabilization year t, is equal to 2050 for a given climate scenario, then
emissions in 2010 are integrated over 40 years to calculate the CCI metric and evaluated 40
years in the future for the ICI, whereas emissions in 2030 are integrated over 20 years or
evaluated 20 years in the future.
I calculate a range of climate scenarios for a commonly-cited radiative forcing threshold,
3 W/m 2, which in equilibrium is consistent with a temperature target of 2*C; however, this
approach could be applied to other climate constraints or policy targets. I use this scenario
family to identify a range of years when radiative forcing reaches the threshold level and
must stabilize to avoid exceeding the threshold (see Fig. 4.5 A.). This range defines the
possible values of t, for calculating the CCI and ICI. Fig. 4.5 B. shows how the CCI and
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ICI value CH 4 , relative to C0 2 , overt time and for different possible values of t,. As the
time of emission approaches t, the CCI and ICI metrics both approach the value of the
instantaneous radiative forcing tradeoff between CH4 and C0 2; however, the approach is
much steeper for the ICI metric than the CCI metric because the ICI does not consider
radiative forcing prior to t, while the CCI does, which leads to higher valuations of CH 4 for
emissions years prior to t,.
Like the GWP and GTP, the CCI and ICI are simple, physically-based metrics. They
are transparent, closed-form (as opposed to outputs of a complex optimization model), and
relatively easy to use; they also fall within current debates in the technology assessment
community about the appropriate time horizon for evaluating technologies [51, and the ap-
propriate time delay for evaluating the GTP [100]. While the idea of anchoring these time
variables has been discussed in the literature [34], I argue that the appropriate time horizon
depends not only on the climate threshold but also on the planned mitigation trajectory and
the context of use for the climate metric - for example, the amount of CO 2 that we expect to
be replaced with CH 4 , given the availability and attractiveness of CH 4-heavy and CH 4-light
energy technologies. I also link metrics to a family of climate scenarios, as opposed to a
single stylized scenario, and illustrate how even limited information about the future climate
system can improve and inform comparisons of energy technologies.
In choosing between integrated metrics like the CCI and instantaneous metrics like the
ICI, we see that in years prior to t, the CCI places a higher value on shorter-lived GHGs,
such as CH 4 , than does the ICI. This effect is more pronounced in early years, far from
t,. Thus, the CCI can be viewed as a more conservative metric, because it places a tighter
limit on the amount of CH 4 that can be emitted. If the CCI and ICI metric are only used
in limited situations (for example, evaluating fuel technologies for personal vehicles in the
U.S.), a metric like the ICI may be appropriate, since the possibility of overshooting global
climate targets with such a small technology sector is negligible. However, if these metrics
are used on a larger scale, the ICI metrics could lead to unacceptably high radiative forcing
values, or high rates of change in radiative forcing, prior to stabilization. When metrics are
expected to receive widespread use and technologies have a large spread from CH 4-light to
CH 4-heavy options - and when the impacts of exceeding thresholds are expected to be high
- the CCI may be a more appropriate metric.
4.4.2 Metric Testing
4.4.2.1 Climate Impacts
I test the CCI and ICI metrics at three levels: first from the perspective of global emissions
trading, second from the perspective of sector-specific technology planning, and third from
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Figure 4.6: I simulate the actual radiative forcing pathway resulting from using the GWP,
ICI, and CCI to allocate 5% of C0 2-equivalent emissions to CH 4 , using (A.)
Scenario A, an early mitigation/late stabilization scenario and (B.) Scenario
E, a late mitigation/early stabilization scenario.
the perspective of individual technology comparisons. Since individual technology choices,
as well as more coordinated technology portfolio planning at the sector level, contribute in
aggregate to changes in the level and composition of global greenhouse gas emissions, it is
necessary to consider these three perspectives simultaneously. Beginning at the global level,
I first simulate multi-gas greenhouse gas emission, concentration, and radiative forcing path-
ways using the CCI, ICI, and GWP, and compare these to corresponding C0 2-only reference
emission scenarios. Fig. 4.6 shows results for the case where 5% of C0 2-equivalent green-
house gas emissions are replaced with CH 4 using different metrics, using two climate scenarios
representing the range of possible pathways to a 3 W/m 2 radiative forcing stabilization.
Examining the performance of the CCI, ICI, and CCI in detail, we observe that radiative
forcing remains below the threshold using the CCI metric and exceeds this threshold by a
significant margin using the GWP metric, regardless of the climate scenario. Using the ICI
metric, radiative forcing slightly exceeds the threshold for the early mitigation/late stabi-
lization scenario but not for the late mitigation/early stabilization scenario. This radiative
forcing "overshoot" is due to the fact that the ICI, as a simple dynamic metric, does not
perfectly capture all features of the future climate system. Specifically, it compares radiative
forcing at the stabilization year but does not explicitly limit changes in radiative forcing
prior to this year. Thus, radiative forcing can exceed the threshold prior to the stabilization
year, even though it will decrease to the threshold value in the stabilization year. In contrast
to the ICI, the GWP never explicitly limits radiative forcing and thus can lead to a more
sustained radiative forcing overshoot.
I explore the sensitivity of the overshoot to several scenario variables, focusing again on
the comparison of the ICI and the GWP (see Appendix for derivations). For both metrics,
the magnitude of the overshoot changes depending on the fraction of emissions controlled by
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Figure 4.7: Overshoot from using the ICI versus the GWP to replace 5% (A. and B.) or
10% (C. and D.) of C0 2-equivalent emissions with CH 4 , under early mitiga-
tion/late stabilization (A. and C.) and late mitigation/early stabilization (B.
and D.) scenarios. The integral, duration, and peak value for the overshoot are
also given for the ICI and the GWP, normalized to the value of the GWP. The
ICI outperforms the GWP in all scenarios shown; however, for early mitiga-
tion/late stabilization scenarios with levels of metric use over 10%, the GWP
can outperform the ICI.
the metric and the background climate scenario (see Fig. 4.7). More specifically, at any point
in time, the difference between the actual radiative forcing value and the reference scenario,
which assumes all emissions are C0 2 , scales linearly with the fraction of emissions allocated
to CH 4 and the total allowed emissions. This difference is labeled ARE. The contribution
of an emission in a given year to the value of ARF in a later year also decays over time at
the rate at which CH 4 is removed from the atmosphere. ARF also depends on the amount
by which the metric "misprices" the actual radiative forcing contribution of CH 4 , relative
to C0 2 , in a given year. The actual overshoot is related to ARF but also depends on the
proximity of the background climate scenario to the climate threshold.
The drivers of ARF described above combine in interesting ways, depending on the met-
ric, to determine the radiative forcing overshoot. In the case of the GWP, the overshoot
is significant across all scenarios examined, but it is greater for late mitigation/early stabi-
lization scenarios, since the late, abrupt reduction in the rate of radiative forcing increase,
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which is required for these scenarios, is not appropriately captured by a static metric like
the GWP. In contrast, for the ICI metric, the overshoot is less than that for the GWP
across all scenarios examined, but it is greater for early mitigation/late stabilization sce-
narios. This is because, since the ICI uses the year of stabilization to establish equivalence
between greenhouse gases, later stabilization years cause the ICI to misprice CH 4 , relative
to C0 2 , for a longer time period, resulting in a higher risk of overshoot. Recognizing that
no metric can perfectly capture the uncertain evolution of the future climate system, these
results underscore the importance of understanding, at the global level, the conditions under
which metrics perform well and the conditions under which they fail.
4.4.2.2 Technology Evaluation
Moving to the level of the transportation sector, I use the CCI, ICI, and GWP to compare the
climate impacts of two sets of fuels discussed in the literature: gasoline versus CNG and corn
ethanol versus algae biodiesel. Whereas the comparison between these technologies is static
using the GWP, these comparisons change over time with the CCI and ICI (see Fig. 4.8 A. and
B.). I then simulate the radiative forcing pathway resulting from supplying all U.S. passenger
vehicle energy demand with each of these fuels, again using the GWP, ICI, and CCI. Since
these three metrics value fuel impacts differently, the resulting radiative forcing pathways
differ from one another - for high-CH4 technologies like CNG and algae biodiesel, radiative
forcing can significantly overshoot the sector's budget, which is determined using a C0 2-only
reference scenario (see Fig. 4.8 C. and D.). I also compute allowed energy consumption across
different metrics and fuel options (see Fig. 4.8 E. and F.). These results highlight two key
points. First, there is significant variability in the valuation, climate impacts, and energy
consumption for high-CH 4 emitting fuels, whereas there is much less variation for low-CH4
fuels, suggesting that the choice of climate metric is less critical for sectors whose emissions
are heavily dominated by CO 2 . Second, there is a clear tradeoff across metrics between higher
energy consumption on the one hand and lower risk for climate threshold overshoots on the
other hand. However, the current quantity of miles traveled cannot be maintained through
2060 using any fuel/metric combination, which underscores the importance of complementary
transportation policies.
While emissions trading requires selecting a single trade-off value between any pair of
greenhouse gases at any point in time, we can gain insights from evaluating energy technology
options across multiple climate metrics. Fig. 4.9 uses the CCI and ICI to compare the
C0 2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions of the seven transportation fuels (plus electricity)
evaluated with the GWP in Fig. 4.2. I compare fuels for two different emission years, 2010
and 2035, and two radiative forcing thresholds, 3 W/m 2 and 4.5 W/m 2 .3 I use error bars to
3 A 4.5 W/m 2 radiative forcing threshold is associated, in equilibrium, with a 3C temperature increase,
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Figure 4.8: Comparisons of (A.) gasoline and CNG and (B.) corn ethanol and algae
biodiesel vary depending on the choice of metric. As a result, (C. and D.) ac-
tual climate impacts and (E. and F.) allowed energy consumption vary across
metrics, and may differ from sector targets.
indicate the variation in fuel impacts across possible climate scenarios consistent with both
radiative forcing thresholds. While fuel comparisons vary depending on the choice of metric,
year of evaluation, climate scenario, and climate threshold, some general insights emerge.
The results show that low-CO 2 , high-CH4 fuels are good candidates for bridging technologies
- technologies that can be used for some period of time but should be subsequently phased
out in favor of low-CO 2 , low-CH 4 options. However, the length of this bridge depends on
the climate thresholds, with a higher threshold allowing a longer period of CH 4-heavy fuel
use, and the climate metric, with the ICI allowing higher CH 4 emissions than the CCI.
The individual emission scenarios within the 3 W/m 2 and 4.5 W/m 2 scenario families also
and is often discussed as an alterantive policy target given the rapid approach of radiative forcing to the
more common 3 W/m 2 threshold.
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I calculate C0 2-equivalent emissions (A.) using the ICI for a 3 W/m 2 scenario,
(B.) using the CCI for a 3 W/m 2 scenario, (C.) using the ICI for a 4.5 W/m 2
scenario, and (D,) using the CCI for a 4.5 W/m 2 scenario. Error bars indicate
how impacts differ across scenarios within a scenario family. Grey lines indicate
the impacts of gasoline, which currently dominates the transportation fuel
market and serves as a baseline for comparing alternative energy options.
introduce some variability, and this variability is more significant for times closer to the
stabilization year. 4
Applying the ICI and CCI provides insights into specific questions about the role of CNG
and algae biodiesel can play in climate change mitigation. Using the ICI and CCI metrics,
CNG used in 2010 ranges from slightly advantageous to slightly disadvantageous for a 3
W/m 2 climate threshold, while CNG used in 2035 has a significantly higher climate impact
than gasoline. However, CNG appears more advantageous under the 4.5 W/m 2 climate
threshold. Given the high infrastructure investment required to switch to CNG-compatible
vehicles and fuel distribution networks, it is likely that natural gas is not a viable bridging fuel
for the transportation sector if climate change is to be limited to a 2*C temperature increase.
4Since the variability is lower in early years, this suggests that flexible infrastructure planning could
have some important advantages for mitigating climate change uncertainty - infrastructure choices will be
consistent under a range of emission scenarios early on and can be adapted in later years as the time when
a climate threshold will be reached becomes more certain.
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Since algae biodiesel has lower CH 4 and CO2 emissions than CNG, it has more potential to
play a role as a bridging fuel. However, its climate advantage over other alternative fuels, for
example corn ethanol, dissipates over time, with impacts in 2035 being higher than those of
sugar cane ethanol, for example. Thus, while algae biodiesel remains advantageous compared
to gasoline, it may be less beneficial than other biofuels. As a result, research investments
in algae biodiesel should be considered carefully, unless economically-feasible approaches for
limiting CH 4 leakage are developed.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
Ch. 4 Results demonstrates the advantages of simple dynamic metrics like the CCI and ICI
for evaluating the time-dependent climate impacts of energy technologies. In this chapter, I
discuss the challenges and opportunities for bringing these new metrics into technology pol-
icymaking, again with a focus on the specific example of alternative transportation fuels. In
Sec. 5.1, 1 review current transportation policies in the U.S. and internationally, highlighting
the most promising areas for piloting new metrics, as well as policies that might be amenable
to new metrics further in the future. In Sec. 5.2, I discuss obstacles to implementing new
metrics, from both a science policy and stakeholder analysis perspective. I then extend the
intuition developed in this chapter to generalize the lessons for transportation and climate
policy to other energy technologies and types of environmental impacts (Sec. 5.3).
5.1 Metrics in Transportation Policy
5.1.1 Current Policies
Scientists and economists generally argue in favor of a global approach to regulating green-
house gas emissions, whether a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system.' Climate metrics
factor into these policies by establishing exchange rates for greenhouse gases, assuming trad-
ing among gases is permitted. However, current climate policy is far from this theoretical
ideal. In reality, climate change mitigation efforts in the U.S. and elsewhere are a hodgepodge
of emissions, technology, economic, and social policy initiatives occurring across market sec-
'Price control (e.g. tax) policies and quantity control (e.g. cap-and-trade) policies have different benefits
and drawbacks. Quantity control policies tend to be more politically appealing, since this policy typically
distributes permits to industry actors to offset the costs of compliance; they also provide more certainty in
the quantity of greenhouse gas emissions, which is important in the presence of climate system thresholds.
In contrast, price control policies are easier to implement and adjust logistically, and more appropriate when
actors demand more certainty and stability in the carbon price.
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tors and local, regional, national, and international levels of government. Although these
fragmented policies may be less efficient than a coordinated global approach, they can nev-
ertheless reduce greenhouse gas emissions and provide climate change mitigation benefits
[109]. However, since many of these fragmented policies are technology-driven, it is critical
to understand how the climate change mitigation potential of energy technologies is eval-
uated, how climate metrics are used in this process, and how the resulting evaluations are
incorporated into technology policy.
This section assess the role of climate metrics in technology policymaking, with an em-
phasis on alternative energy sources for transportation and in particular alternative fuel
technologies. I begin with a review the transportation energy policies in the U.S., with a
special focus on California, and international contexts, with a focus on the alternative fuel
programs in Europe and Brazil. Transportation policy in general, and alternative fuel policy
in particular, is highly fragmented. Furthermore, climate change mitigation is often not the
primary motivation for these policies, if it is a motivation at all - energy security and eco-
nomic development, particularly in the agricultural sector, are also critical concerns. Given
that they must balance these diverse and sometimes contradictory motivations, transporta-
tion policies may appear inefficient from a climate change mitigation perspective. As the
case studies below demonstrate, the current and future role of climate metrics depends on
how climate concerns are integrated into transportation technology policy.
U.S. Transportation Policy. The oil price shocks of the late 1970s precipitated a wave
of transportation energy policies in the U.S. These policies fall into four major categories:
(a) energy taxes and subsidies, (b) fuel mandates, (c) research and development, and (d)
vehicle policies. The Energy Tax Act of 1978, followed by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980, reduced fuel taxes on the E10, a 10% ethanol blend with gasoline.2'3
The Energy Security Act of 1980 created alternative fuel research programs at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, with further research funding and tax exemptions provided by the
Surface Transportation Assistance Act.4'5 At the same time, the Corporate Average Fuel
Efficiency (CAFE) standards, introduced in 1975, provided subsidies for vehicles running on
E85, an 85% ethanol blend with gasoline, along with setting other complementary policies
to improve vehicle fuel efficiency. The primary goal of these early policies was to promote
energy security and avoid economic disruptions due to fluctuations in oil prices. The focus
was on ethanol biofuels as well as synthetic fuels.
Following the rapid policy development of the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a
2Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
3Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
4Energy Security Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 616 (1980).
5Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C., 96 Stat. 2097 (1982).
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twenty year lull. However, two influential pieces of legislation were passed during this time.
First, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 mandated blending oxygenates in gasoline. 6,7
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 also designated BD100 (100% biodiesel fuels) and E85 as
alternative fuels for policy purposes, and established the Alternative Transportation Fuel
Program to promote reductions in petroleum consumption.' These policies, along with a
second surge of transportation energy policies in the 2000s, show an increasing focus on
biofuels (see [59] for a review). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 set standards for increasing
volumes of biofuel production (of which corn ethanol is the majority contributor) through
the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), one of the most powerful biofuel support mechanisms
in the U.S." The U.S. EPA is responsible for implementing this standard. The Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 extended the blending mandates, including
a target for 36 billion gallons to be blended by 2022."
While early alternative fuel policies did not explicitly address climate concerns, the EISA
required that fuels used to meet its blending requirements have lower greenhouse gas emis-
sions than gasoline. As discussed in Sec. 2.1, comparing the life cycle greenhouse gas emis-
sions of conventional and alternative fuels is challenging and uncertain; with the EISA re-
quirement, these comparisons have also become highly politicized, particularly given the
strong interests that specialized groups (in particular the corn ethanol industry) in promot-
ing certain biofuels. More recently, the EPA attempted an indirect approach to promote
low-carbon fuels, requiring that 20 million of the 36 billion gallon mandate be satisfied with
cellulosic ethanol. However, this requirement was struck down in federal court because there
was insufficient market supply to meet the mandate [97]. Corn ethanol continues to main-
tain a dominant share in U.S. biofuel markets. Although the tariff and tax credit for biofuel
production expired at the end of 2011, the RFS has kept biofuel production high, supplying
10% of U.S. fuel demand in that year [81].12
Beyond the national level, individual states in the U.S. have introduced a variety of
transportation energy policies. California has been a leader in this area. In 2007, the
California Air Resources Board introduced the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), which
6Alternative fuels such as ethanol and methanol (MTBE) can satisfy this oxygenate blending requirement;
however, ethanol has become an increasingly popular choice for satisfying this requirement due to concerns
about groundwater contamination by MTBE.
'Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (1990).
8Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-496 (1992).
9Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58 (2005).
'
0 The original RFS mandates called for 4 billion gallons of biofuel to be blended by the year 2006, 6.1
billion gallons by 2009, and 7.5 billion gallons by 2012.
"Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 (2007).
'
2 The EPA is also increasing the blending wall for ethanol in conventional vehicles
from 10% to 15%, allowing further potential for expansion of the ethanol market (see
hittp:// www.e)a.gov/otaq/regs/ fuels/additive/el5/index.htmn)
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took effect in 2011.13 Rather than setting volumetric targets for certain types of alternative
fuels, as is done in the RFS, the LCFS sets a target for reductions in the average carbon
intensity of the transportation fuel mix. The LCFS calls for a reduction in carbon intensity of
10% by 2020, which can be achieved through a combination of improved processing efficiency
and sourcing decisions (thus making gasoline less carbon-intensive) and using alternative
fuels, including purchasing credits for low-carbon electricity for electric vehicles. Carbon
intensity is defined in terms of aggregated life cycle C0 2 -equivalent emissions, including
land use changes, and CO 2 equivalence is determined using the GWP with the traditional
time horizon of 100 years [84]. A hybrid carbon trading/technology target policy like the
LCFS may be a model for future climate change mitigation policies at the national level,
since it embeds climate goals directly in the policy formulation.
International Transportation Policies. Apart from the U.S., two other major players in
the alternative transportation energy arena are Europe and Brazil. Policies in the E.U., as in
the U.S., focus strongly on biofuels, although policies in the E.U. tend to promote bioenergy
for both transportation fuels and electricity generation simultaneously. An E.U. renewable
energy white paper issued in 2002 set voluntary targets for biofuel shares in transportation
in 2005 and 2010; while the E.U. as a whole fell short of these targets, some countries
(notably Germany) did see high penetration of biofuels." In 2005, the Biomass Action Plan
created a more comprehensive set of policies to promote biofuels, including new national
production targets, requirements for suppliers to blend biofuels, and funding for alternative
fuel research and development.' 5 The European Commission published new targets in 2007
to have 10% biofuels for transportation and 20% greenhouse gas emissions reductions by
2020, goals that were later endorsed by the European Parliament in 2009.16 The E.U. also
places a strong emphasis on promoting agriculture through bioenergy, including subsidies
for growing energy crops, land set asides, loans and other funding for production facilities
and distribution infrastructure.
In addition to the E.U. and U.S., some developing countries have created alternative fuel
programs, again often with a focus on biofuels. Brazil in particular has seen significant pene-
tration of alternative fuels, specifically bioethanol from sugar cane (see [17] for an overview).
While the sugar industry in Brazil had been supported by the government for centuries,
support for sugar cane ethanol began in 1975 with the ProAlcool Program.'7 This program
established a target to produce 35 billion liters of ethanol by 1980 and provided other pro-
13 Executive Order S-1-07 issues by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.
14 Renewable Energy: White Paper laying down a Community strategy and action plan, COM(2001)69.
i"Biomass Action Plan, COM(2005)628.
16 Directive 2009/28/EC.
17Presidential Decree No. 17.593 of November 14, 1975.
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duction incentives. Since the introduction of ProAlcool, Brazil has aggressively promoted
ethanol as a mechanism to stabilize sugar prices and promote energy security. Brazil ex-
panded the original program to include increased ethanol targets, extended in 2013 to 25%,
as well as blending and distribution requirements and mandates for ethanol-compatible ve-
hicles. While there have been ups and downs in the Brazilian market for sugar cane ethanol,
Brazil is largely viewed as an alternative fuel success story. Other developing countries
have promoted different alternative fuels, including palm and jatropha oil, with mixed and
sometimes negative effects on the economy and environment [88].
Overall, transportation energy policies in the U.S., E.U., Brazil, and other countries share
some common characteristics. First, as with many types of climate and energy policy, they
are highly fragmented. Countries frequently rely on a portfolio of policies including direct
subsidies, reductions in taxes or tariffs, production and blending mandates, and policies to
promote vehicles that are energy-efficient and compatible with alternative fuels. Second,
while synthetic fuels, electric vehicles, and other fuels (e.g. natural gas) have received some
attention, biofuels has seen the widest promotion and adoption to date. Third, transporta-
tion energy policies are motivated by a variety of goals, including climate change mitigation
but also energy security and economic development, especially in critical industries like agri-
culture. The potential role for complex metrics in current and future transportation energy
policies will depend on how evaluations of the climate impacts of alternative transportation
fuels are incorporated, either explicitly or implicitly, into these policies.
5.1.2 Role for New Metrics
Complex climate metrics can play a role in a variety of policy applications. These applications
include: (a) greenhouse gas emissions trading, (b) research and development projects, (c)
technology performance standards, subsides, and mandates, and (d) sector performance
standards, such as average carbon intensity targets. Current evaluations of climate metrics
tend to focus on the first application, greenhouse gas emissions trading. It is commonly
assumed that simple metrics are essential for this application [3, 99]. While this argument
is debatable - exchange rates in other applications, for example currency exchange rates,
fluctuate and change over time - there has been resistance in the policy community to
updating climate metrics. In fact, although the scientific community has updated the value
of the GWP several times as new information about greenhouse gases (in particular, their
indirect effects on other radiative forcing agents) becomes available [98, 102], the Kyoto
Protocol still relies on the older, original GWP values for establishing exchange rates between
greenhouse gases.
On the other hand, outside of the emissions trading area, complex metrics for decision-
making have become increasingly common. As one prominent example, analysts evaluating
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financial investments often consider multiple metrics, including net present value, internal
rate of return, payback period, and benefit/cost ratio. Often, these simple metrics are com-
plemented with other, more complex tools, such as decision analysis, target curve analysis,
and multi-objective optimization. Research suggests that using decision tools of intermedi-
ate complexity can improve the design of projects, for example by incorporating the value
of flexible design into measures of project design costs and benefits [201. Although some re-
sistance remains, the idea of flexible design (and the more complex analytical tools required
to preform this type of analysis) is gaining traction in the engineering community because
of its potential to improve value, particularly under situations of high uncertainty [19].
Moving to the life cycle assessment community, whose work is critical in evaluating
technology impacts, we also see examples of complex metrics. One area that has received
considerable attention recently is the timing of emissions within the technology life cycle.
Traditionally, life cycle assessment assumes for simplicity that all life cycle emissions occur
in the same year.18 Some industrial ecologists have developed alternative formulations of
the GWP that account for the timing of emissions. For example, emissions in the first year
of the technology life cycle (e.g. constructing a power plant) are integrated for 100 years,
whereas emissions 80 years later (e.g. decommissioning a power plant) are integrated for 20
years. The extent to which these metrics change technology comparisons depends on the
technologies being compared and the distribution of their emissions over time [65, 96]. While
these new metrics have not yet gained traction in the policy community, other updates to
life cycle assessment methods (for example, the inclusion of land use change emissions) have
been incorporated, so there is precedent to suggest that such updates are possible.
In summary, while it has been difficult to update climate metrics for emissions trading,
and there has been some resistance to new methods in other contexts such as flexible design,
the growing prominence of complex metrics in financial and technology assessment suggests
a potential avenue for new climate metrics. In fact, new climate metrics like the simple
dynamic metrics discussed in Sec. 4.4 may be appropriate for a wide variety of technology
policies, including research and development projects, technology performance standards,
mandates and subsidies, and sector performance standards. Since these technology policies
are currently the major levers for addressing climate change in the U.S. and many other
countries, new climate metrics may in fact have a critical role to play in the climate change
mitigation challenge. However, getting stakeholder buy-in with new metrics may not be
easy. I discuss these challenges below.
8For example, in the case of alternative fuels, emissions occur during the construction of fuel production
facilities, production of the fuels (and, in the case of biofuels, temporary negative emissions occur when
agricultural crops absorb CO2 to produce biomass), and combustion of the fuel in the vehicle. Since these
emissions take place over a period of time, calculating emissions as though they are emitted all at once
over-estimates the impacts of emissions later in the life cycle, relative to those occurring earlier on.
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5.2 Challenges for Metrics in Policy
5.2.1 Science Policy Analysis
In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, governments are relying more and
more on specialized forms of knowledge to inform public policy. While science writ large
maintains a certain collective authority over the generation and evaluation of knowledge,
the types of knowledge required for policymaking often extend beyond traditional areas of
scientific expertise. For these science policy problems, decision-makers must balance known
costs against uncertain or unquantifiable benefits, assess high risk/low probability events,
understand the social context of technology choices, and evaluate scientific evidence in novel
areas where standardized methods are absent. Climate metrics provide a recent and salient
example of these difficulties. The costs of climate change mitigation are substantial, and
the expected impacts of unmitigated climate change - including increases in severe weather
events, complete melting of continental ice sheets, and reversal of ocean currents - are highly
uncertain and potentially irreversible [64]. Similar difficulties are common in other critical
policy areas, ranging from pharmaceuticals to bioengineering to national defense. In each of
these areas, an essential question for science policy is: how can specialized knowledge best
inform rule-making on these rapidly developing, socially relevant issues?
When creating and evaluating specialized knowledge, scientists and policymakers have
traditionally focused on a simplified narrative of the science policy process, where scientific
knowledge is first generated independently by scientists and then is subsequently assessed by
policymakers and incorporated into rule-making. This purportedly clear boundary between
science and policy leads to a simple set of prescriptions to improve the science policy pro-
cess. From the perspective of the policymaker, recommendations typically revolve around
improved knowledge assessment [70], more complete understanding of the technical details
of policy problems [75], and incorporation of new methods, such as risk assessment, into the
policy process [74]. From the perspective of the scientist, recommendations emphasize keep-
ing science separate from the policy process to maintain the purity of scientific knowledge,
a goal embodied in the famous CUDOS principals of science [71].'9 Underlying both sets
of recommendations is an essentialist perspective, which assumes there are objective truths
that science seeks to uncover, and that boundaries can be drawn between what is science
and what is non-science, with science having an authority over other types of knowledge
classified as non-science.
While this simplified narrative might seem to provide a manageable framework for the
'
9 The CUDOS principals for science include: communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, originality,
and (organized) skepticism. These principals assume that science can be, or should strive to be, separated
from external social and political factors.
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rule-making process, it does not adequately reflect current challenges in science policy. As an
alternative, recognizing that science is a process embedded in the prevailing social context
can enrich the science policy narrative and bring new insights to the policy process. In
"Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science," Sheila Jasanoff describes this social
process [51]. When policies are informed by specialized knowledge, this knowledge is not
taken at face value but rather is scrutinized during the rule-making process. The process is
often adversarial, with stakeholders seeking to gain legitimacy for their own knowledge claims
while questioning the legitimacy of competing claims. To establish legitimacy, stakeholders
will often attempt to define clear boundaries around their areas of expertise, a process referred
to as boundary work [35]. In this process, scientists give up certain normative questions from
their rhetoric to preserve the authority of science, while policymakers describe scientific input
as objective and unbiased to lend legitimacy to their policy decisions.
Out of this process of boundary work, a peculiar pattern emerges. During the messy rule-
making process, scientists and policymakers are forced to examine specialized knowledge at a
deeper level. However, they must also reconstruct a plausible narrative for their science policy
choices after a decision has been made. This narrative often constructs a clear boundary
between science and policy and deemphasizes the vast middle ground between science and
policy where conflicts actually played out during the rule-making process. In fact, both
scientists and policymakers, in their respective science policy narratives, may ascribe the
most controversial aspects of new policies to the expertise of the other group. As a result,
these policies can have no clear owners or advocates after the rule-making process is complete.
Without a clear claim of ownership, these orphaned products of science policy can become
hardened and partially insulated from further scrutiny, making them particularly difficult to
adapt.
While this constructivist view of the science policy process is more complete, this feature
alone does not justify replacing the more simplified narrative. However, in the case of climate
metrics, a constructivist view is particularly revealing. Designing climate metrics requires
scientific information, such as how long greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere, along
with value judgements, such as how the impacts of these gases should be valued over time.
The development of climate metrics was a science policy decision, where value claims were
central to the analysis, not an afterthought that was incorporated after the scientific analysis
was complete (see Sec. 2.2.2). However, a simplified narrative of the science policy process
has prevented these metrics from being revised, in spite of serious scientific and normative
criticisms. Climate metrics are seen as relatively uncontroversial in the area where they are
most commonly used: the technology evaluation and climate policy. Thus, the first step
increasing adoption of complex metrics is to effectively communicate the challenges with
current metrics and the potential benefits of alternative approaches.
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5.2.2 Stakeholder Analysis
Discussions of stakeholder acceptance of climate metrics are generally superficial. While this
thesis does not attempt to perform a comprehensive stakeholder analysis, in this section
I present a brief overview of the stakeholders involved in climate change decision-making,
and the characteristics these stakeholders might look for in a climate metric. As discussed
in Sec. 5.1 above, climate metrics can be used in a variety of applications, including many
different types of technology policies. The preference for different metric characteristics may
vary substantially across stakeholders and metric applications. Performance characteristics
of interest may include:
1. Simplicity: How complicated is the metric to use? Is it a constant value or does it
change over time - and if so, how?
2. Predictability: Can the metric value be updated to reflect new climate, technology,
and policy information? If so, how predictable are these changes?
3. Transparency: How transparent is the metric development process? Can the assump-
tions on which the metric values are based be easily identified and assessed?
4. Credibility: Are the metrics developed by knowledgable and trustworthy people or
groups? Are these entities perceived to be objective and have relevant expertise?
5. Legitimacy: How open is the metric development process, and what groups were rep-
resented during this process? What groups were left out?
6. Accuracy: Does the metric appropriately capture, to the best available knowledge, the
essential features of the policy problem it is purporting to measure?
These characteristics are not necessarily independent of one another; for example, a metric
with high credibility may not necessitate the same level of transparency as a less credible
metric. Given these interactions, it is easy to conflate different metric characteristics. Dis-
cussions of metric complexity, for example, many not clearly distinguish between metric
simplicity and metric predictability, which is particularly problematic because there may be
inherent tradeoffs among these dimensions.
The five characteristics described above are not objective performance criteria; rather,
they are interpretative. Thus, when assessing if a metric is credible, for example, it is
important to ask the question - credible to whom? For discussion purposes, we can roughly
divide potential stakeholders into four groups:
1. Government: e.g. legislators, government agencies, the executive branch; these can
exist at local, state, federal, and international levels.
74
2. Business: e.g. technology developers, producers, suppliers, and users; objectives vary
greatly depending on the technology and industry.
3. Public: e.g. consumers, who may be sensitive to price changes, and voters, who want
funding to be used efficiently and in their interest.
4. Special interests: e.g. populations vulnerable to climate and environmental impacts,
environmental and industry interest groups.
There is also considerable diversity within these stakeholder groups. Given the multiplicity
of metric users, applications, and performance criteria, it is unlikely that any single metric
is appropriate for all stakeholders, in all situations, and across all dimensions. Further work
could involve a more formal stakeholder analysis that identifies and classifies stakeholders [80]
and analyzes their interests [10, 115], while recognizing challenges in conducting stakeholder
analyses in practice [52]. However, this framework can identify hypothesis for when and how
complex metrics can play a role in climate policy.
Metric simplicity and predictability appear to be priorities in the case of emissions trad-
ing, given the large number of actors involved and the precedent for a static, non-adaptive
metric established by the Kyoto Protocol, in practice if not in language. In contrast, re-
search and development funding involves fewer actors and frequently relies on complex,
multidimensional decision-making strategies: this application is a promising starting point
for introducing new metrics of intermediate complexity to climate policy. Here, metrics are
not used directly in the policy framework but rather to inform broader technology decisions
- for example, prioritizing funding for cellulosic ethanol versus algae biodiesel. Other po-
tential inroads include government technology mandates and subsidies, which again rely on
a variety of metrics and technology assessments and might be amenable to new methods.
Finally, sector technology targets such as clean energy standards are a potential future venue
for climate metrics of intermediate complexity. However, these policies involve a larger num-
ber of actors, and technology comparisons (and thus climate metrics) play a central role
in the policy formulation; thus, introducing new metrics may be more challenging than for
technology standards and research and development.
5.3 Insights for Other Policy Areas
5.3.1 Electricity Technology Policy
In his 2012 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama called for Congress to
establish a new energy standard for the electricity sector, as part of his goal to double
clean energy use in the United States by 2035 [56]. Congress responded to this challenge
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by introducing the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (CES), a bill sponsored by Senator
Bingaman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The bill
establishes goals for a certain percentage of electricity in the United States to be generated
by "clean" energy, beginning with 24% in 2015 and increasing by 3% per year through 2035
[9]. The CES is a market-based performance standard that awards full or partial credits
to various energy technologies, including natural gas, nuclear, hydropower, and non-hydro
renewables, based on their life cycle greenhouse gas emissions relative to coal-fired electricity.
These credits are allocated by aggregating greenhouse gas emissions using the GWP.
As discussed in more detail in Ch. 4, the potential error introduced by using the GWP to
calculate C0 2-equivalent emissions depends on the extent to which emissions are composed of
non-CO 2 greenhouse gases. Some energy technologies, such as nuclear energy and non-hydro
renewables, have relatively low emissions, and the emissions that do occur are primarily
CO 2. Other energy technologies, such as natural gas and hydropower, have substantial CH 4
emissions. These nuances were not adequately incorporated into an assessment conducted by
the EIA at the request of Senator Bingaman, which concluded that the CES would increase
electricity generated from clean energy sources [16]. A closer inspection reveals that the
vast majority of this clean energy target would be met by substituting coal with natural
gas, and other energy sources such as non-hydro renewables would represent a relatively
small portion of the clean energy target, with solar energy investments showing almost no
increase. 20 These results are not surprising, given the cost advantages of natural gas over
the other energy sources included in the CES. Nevertheless, the fact that natural gas emits
a substantial amount of CH 4 during its life cycle demonstrates that the choice of emissions
metric is critical to allocating clean energy credits.
This issue is further complicated by the rise of shale gas in the U.S. Approximately 50%
of natural gas in the U.S. comes from so-called "unconventional" sources, including shale
gas, and the EIA projects that this share will increase to 70% by 2035 [28]. The concerns
about natural gas leakage discussed in Sec. 2.1 have also been discussed in the context of the
electricity sector; in fact, debates about the climate change mitigation potential of natural
gas versus coal electricity generation have been a focal point of this discussion [11, 44, 45].
Because the CES relies on partial clean energy credits, changes in measures used to assess the
relative effects of natural gas and coal on climate change can have importance implications for
policy and practice. However, despite the heated debate over the C0 2-equivalent emissions
of coal and natural gas, little attention has been given to the metric used to calculate
CO 2 equivalence. Rather, the GWP is generally assumed to represent the consensus of the
climate science community, particularly among practitioners in the technology assessment
20 Note that this analysis is based on the Senator Bingaman's formulation of a clean energy standard [161;
other formulations could have different costs, technology trajectories, and climate impacts [2].
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community.
The specific case of the CES is illustrative of a more general observation that uncertainties
in metrics, while they may be recognized by the community generating the metrics, are not
generally incorporated into discussions within the technology assessment community. This
observation is troubling because it is through these very assessments that climate change
mitigation targets in the U.S. and elsewhere are most likely to be operationalized, as the
formulation of the CES illustrates. More complex climate metrics, which are linked to
changes in the underlying climate system, can improve our understanding of the role of
different electricity technologies in a clean energy portfolio. While natural gas electricity
is often loosely discussed as a "bridging fuel," metrics that do not capture the dynamic
tradeoffs between greenhouse gases cannot quantify this bridge. Future research can apply
the CCI, ICI, and other dynamic climate metrics to explore the changing role of natural gas
electricity in the climate change mitigation challenge, among other research questions in the
electricity sector.
5.3.2 Other Environmental Policies
In the introduction to this thesis, I describe the challenges with evaluating the environmental
impacts of energy technologies in the context of a changing environmental system - and the
need for metrics that can link technology decisions made at different levels of aggregation
to large-scale environmental impacts. The case of climate change, as explored in this thesis,
illustrates the potential for simple dynamic metrics, anchored to a changing background
climate state, to improve technology policy. This methodology can be extended to other
types of environmental impacts, including local and regional air pollution and land, water,
and material resource constraints. However, these other environmental and resource systems
have very different dynamics than the climate system, and the extension of these methods
thus involves some care. I discuss three critical issues for adapting anchored climate metrics
to other environmental systems: different spatial and temporal dynamics, different types of
thresholds, and difficulties in comparing multiple environmental impacts.
Climate change operates over many different time scales. Although the greenhouse gases
discussed in this thesis vary in terms of their lifetimes in the atmosphere and heat-trapping
abilities, they are all broadly classified as long-lived greenhouse gases. While there is new
research on the climate metrics for more short-lived forcing agents, the dramatic differences
in temporal properties exacerbates challenges with the treatment of time. Other environ-
mental impacts also operate on different time scales. On the one hand, local and regional
air pollutants may be removed from the atmosphere in a matter of days, weeks, or months.
On the other hand, constraints on resources such as water may not be reached for decades
or centuries in some locations (in other locations, they have already been reached or sur-
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passed); similarly the time scales for replenishing water resources, especially underground
water resources called "fossil water," are very long. Issues with the treatment of time and
intergenerational equity, already critical for climate change, may be even more challenging
when extended to other environmental impacts.
At the same time, other environmental impacts also bring the added dimension of spatial
complexity. While climate change impacts may vary widely across different locations, the
location of a greenhouse gas emission - to a reasonable approximation - does not change
its climate impacts, since the lifetimes of gases greatly exceed mixing times. This is- not the
case for other environmental impact categories. Air pollution levels and resource constraints
differ dramatically across different locations and directly affect technology appropriateness;
for example, a water-intensive technology may be a good choice in a water-rich region, but in
a desert it would deplete already scarce water resources. As a result, we would expect metrics
for other environmental impacts to not only vary across time, as climate metrics should, but
also across different locations. In addition, the value of metrics may depend on the spatial
scale of the analysis, since aggregated measures of pollution and resource availability can
mask acute, small-scale issues.
Calculating other environmental metrics with the climate metrics approach also requires
us to identify environmental thresholds. In the case of climate change, we use two repre-
sentative thresholds, 3 and 4.5 W/m 2 , which in equilibrium are associated with 2 and 3*C
temperature changes, respectively. The location and meaning of these climate thresholds are
highly uncertain [63]. For example, the commonly-cited 2*C temperature threshold is the
product of a science policy process, similar to that discussed in Sec. 5.2.1 for climate metrics.
Thus, these thresholds can be justified on both physical and political grounds. However, it
is debatable whether these uncertain thresholds should be viewed as a rough guideline or a
binding constraint. In the same vein as climate thresholds, thresholds have also been cal-
culated for other environmental systems [92]. Given the critical role that thresholds play in
approximate climate and environmental metrics, these thresholds must be interpreted with
great care. Furthermore, the interpretation may vary depending on the threshold, which
can take the form of a hard resource constraint, resource usage rate limit, recommended
pollutant concentration, or climate change threshold, among others.
Finally, extending system-oriented climate metrics to include other types of environmen-
tal metrics introduces the possibility of comparing energy technologies against multiple en-
vironmental criteria simultaneously. One approach is to weight and aggregate metrics-based
impacts into a single environmental impact score [50]. However, as discussed in Sec. 2.1,
aggregating environmental impacts requires value judgements, and reasonable aggregation
schemes can yield very different technology comparisons. A more transparent approach is to
place environmental impacts on separate axes and examine tradeoffs. Understanding these
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tradeoffs can help inform the development of technologies in the laboratory, for example by
prioritizing improvements along various environmental dimensions. It can also guide the
design of portfolios of technologies to meet multiple environmental targets. These portfo-
lios can address a variety of questions but are also critical for studying the climate change
mitigation potential of different energy technologies, thereby informing models of economic
development and climate change as well as guiding energy technology policy.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The case for a new set of metrics is strong. To avoid dangerous climate change and meet
commonly-cited climate policy targets, we need metrics that can identify technology invest-
ments today that are robust across a range of possible climate conditions 10, 20, and even 30
years in the future. Since climate policy goals are implemented through technology choices,
and technologies are evaluated using climate metrics, the choice of metric can have a large
impact on aggregate greenhouse gas emissions and, consequently, global climate outcomes.
We need metrics that can anticipate the actual climate performance of energy technologies,
to avoid making inappropriate, and often costly, investments in research and development
or technology infrastructure.
In this thesis, I find that the climate impact of a greenhouse gas depends both on the
timing of the emission and the state of the climate system. Specifically, as climate thresholds
are approached, gases with shorter lifetimes, which are less relevant further from thresholds,
become increasingly important. Emissions decisions using current metrics, which do not
reflect these climate dynamics and therefore undervalue shorter-lived gases close to thresh-
olds, can lead to higher levels of climate change than anticipated. At the same time, current
metrics also overvalue shorter-lived gases further away from climate thresholds, resulting in
overly strict emissions limits and lost opportunities for increased energy consumption.
Using limited information about the temporal characteristics of greenhouse gases, I design
a pair of new climate metrics - the CCI and the ICI - for comparing energy technologies,
focusing specifically on alternative transportation fuels. Under a large range of plausible
future climate scenarios, these metrics improve on current approaches like the GWP for
making technology and emissions decisions. However, in some cases, the less-conservative
ICI metric can lead to an overshoot of climate thresholds, albeit generally less than the
overshoot from using the GWP. This overshoot is more pronounced for high levels of metric
adoption, higher availability and attractiveness of CH4 -heavy technologies, more gradual
emissions reduction scenarios, and higher target climate thresholds. In contrast, the GWP
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performs worse under rapid emissions reduction scenarios.
Comparing alternative transportation fuels using the CCI and ICI, I find that high-
CH4 , low-CO 2 technology options can provide a "bridge" to a low carbon energy future;
however, since the impact of CH 4 intensifies over time, this bridge may be shorter than
previously assumed [73]. Given, for instance, the high infrastructure investments required
for significant natural gas fuel penetration, or the research investments required to make
algae biofuels viable, these high-CH 4 technologies should be considered with caution. Their
advantages over other technology options, for example gasoline in the case of natural gas or
other biofuels in the case of algae biodiesel, may be too short lived to justify large investments.
Natural gas may be more effectively used in the electricity sector, where up front investment
costs are much lower [116]. Innovation in algae biofuels should concentrate on reducing CH4
leakage to increase its attractiveness from a climate perspective.
The insights gained from new metrics like the CCI and ICI are substantial, but these
insights are only relevant if they are actually incorporated into policy decisions. While
slightly more complex than current metrics like the GWP, the CCI and ICI are less complex
than many alternative metric proposals. This feature may make them more user-friendly
for decision-makers. At the same time, metrics of intermediate complexity may be more
amenable to climate policy than previously assumed. While a single, simple metric may be
desirable for emissions trading [77], there is a precedent for complex, multi-metric decision-
making in technology assessment [50]. Since technology policy is becoming a dominant tool
for climate policy, these technology-focused metrics can play a critical role in meeting the
climate change mitigation challenge.
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Appendix A
Derivations
In this appendix, I derive an analytical expression for the "radiative forcing overshoot."
I define the radiative forcing overshoot as the amount by which radiative forcing exceeds
the intended forcing threshold (for example, 3 W/m 2 ) in a given year; thus, if radiative
forcing is below the threshold, the radiative forcing overshoot is negative. To determine the
overshoot, I calculate the difference between the radiative forcing pathway under a mixed gas
emission scenario (which includes C0 2 , CH 4 , and N2 0 emissions, where non-CO 2 emissions
are determined using a metric) versus a C0 2-only emission scenario.1 From Eq. 3.31, we
know that total radiative forcing for the mixed gas case is
RF(t) LRFK(CK(t)) + LRFm(cM(t)) + RFA(t)
= AK [CK(t) - CK(0)] + RFK(CK(0)) + Am [CM(t) - CM(0)
+ RFM(CM(0)) + RFA(t), (A.1)
where RFA(t) accounts for all non-CO 2, non-CH 4 forcings. Using Eqs. 3.29 and 3.30 to
expand the CO 2 and CH 4 concentration terms, we have
RF(t) = AK [(CK(tO) + CKL(t) + (1 - q) e (tfK(t t')dt) CK(o)1 + RFK(CK(0))
+ Am C(tO) + CML(t) + q e(t 1)f(t, t) - dt - CM(o)
+ RFm(cM(0)) + RFA(0, (A.2)
'As in the previous sections, I provide derivations for a simpler, two-gas (CO 2 and CH4 ), but these
derivations can easily be extended to the three-gas case (C0 2, CH 4 , and N2 0) used in the results.
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where p is a generic climate metric and q is the fraction of total, C0 2-equivalent emissions
allocated to CH 4 . The difference between the mixed gas emissions case (where q :/ 0) and
the C0 2-only emissions case (where q = 0) is
ARF(t) = qje(t') AMfM(tt') - AKfK(ttf) dt'. (A-3)
Since we plan emissions in the CO 2 only case such that the resulting radiative forcing
trajectory remains below some threshold value, RFc, ARF shows us how far off we are from
our planned radiative forcing trajectory. However, we may care less about ARF(t) directly
and more about the overshoot of RFc. The overshoot is defined by
Overshoot = RF(t, q) - RFc, (A.4)
where RF(t, q) is the radiative forcing at a given point in time t for a given value of q. We
can rewrite RF(t, q) as the sum of the radiative forcing in the C0 2-only scenario, RF(t, 0)
and ARF. Thus,
Overshoot = ARF(t) + RF(t, 0) - RFc. (A.5)
We see that the overshoot depends not only on the drivers of ARF(t) but also on the dif-
ference between the C0 2-only radiative forcing pathway and the radiative forcing threshold,
which decreases over time as the threshold is approached. Thus, we expect, all else equal,
that emission scenarios that rapidly approach the radiative forcing threshold will have more
risk of overshoot than those that have a more gradual approach to the threshold.
Having derived the radiative forcing overshoot for an arbitrary climate metric pt(t) and
an arbitrary fraction of emissions q allocated to CH 4 , I now extend this analysis to examine
three specific metrics: the ICI, CCI, and GWP (which I call pl, pL2, and 93, respectively for
notational simplicity). The framing of the overshoot problem I have provided here supposes
that emissions are the decision lever, with some fraction of emissions being allocated to
different greenhouse gases. In reality, as I argue elsewhere in this thesis, technology is
typically the decision lever, rather than abstract emissions. From a technology perspective,
we can think of q as the fraction of emissions allocated to a sector, where a single technology
that emits only CH 4 is used to supply the sector's energy demand. In the final part of this
section, I generalize the simple, CH 4-only technology example to the case where the sector's
technology mix emits both CH 4 and CO 2.
The ICI Metric (pi). Substituting in [i for the metric into Eq. A.3, we have
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ARF(t) q j e(t') [AMfM(t, t') AKfK(ts t') - AKfKt, t') dt'. (A.6)
o .m .m Af(t, It)
Rearranging terms, we have
ARF(t) q fe(t') -AMfM(t,t) AKfk(t ,t) AKK (tt) dt. (A7)
Jo LAMfM(tst') AMf M(t,ti) J
We can see that when t = to, ARF = 0, as we would expect since p1 uses radiative forcing
in year t, as a basis for establishing equivalence between gases. Examining the difference
between the actual and projected radiative forcing at a given point in time, we see that
1. ARF(t) scales linearly with q, the fraction of emissions allocated to CH4 ; e(t'), the
greenhouse gas emission budget in a given year; and Am, the radiative efficiency (ra-
diative forcing per unit gas) of CH 4.
2. The contribution of an emission in year t' to ARF leading up to year t decays at the
rate at which CH 4 is removed from the atmosphere, fM(t, t').
3. Teterm AKfK(t,t)The AMfM(tt') gives the actual ratio of radiative forcing contributions in year t
of CO 2 and CH4 emitted in year t'; the term AKfk(tt') gives the metric's estimate of
this ratio. Thus, the difference between these two terms gives the error in the relative
valuation of CO 2 and CH 4. ARF(t) scales linearly with this error.
These relationships are very intuitive - since m etrics like p1 essentially "misprice" CH 4 in
most years (other than t,), we expect the overshoot to grow with the amount of CH 4 emitted
and the magnitude of the mispricing.
The CCI Metric ([2). We can perform a similar calculation for p2:
t ftt AK fK WX ldt"
ARF(t) q / e(t') AMfM(tt) - -tl AmfK(t, t)dt AKfK(t, t') dt' (A.8)
J, ' AufM(t" , t')dt" AufM(t, t')
Note that this expression does not simplify to equal zero when t = t,; however, the depen-
dencies of ARF on the variables described above still hold.
The GWP Metric (P3). We can also perform this analysis for p3. Since this metric is
static, we leave p3 in the expression as is:
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ARF(t) q e(t') [AM fM(t,t) - - AKfK(tt) dt' (A.11)
fo t .A3 Aufm(tjt L1
The Technology Case. If the CH4 emissions intensity of a technology (1M) equals zero,
and we again assume a simple world with CH 4 and CO 2 as the only greenhouse gases, then
all emissions will be CO 2. However, if qM does not equal zero, some of these emissions will
be CH 4, which means we will be operating in a mixed gas emission scenario. The difference
mixed gas case and CO 2 only case is
ARF(t) - pAKj ( - e(t')fK(t t')dt'
+ pAM j ( qm ) e(t)fm(t,t1)dt', (A. 12).
which simplifies to (substituting in the expression for q (t), Eq. 3.32)
ARF(t) = p j~te( [(K - n (t')) AK fK ( t') ± MAMfm(t I t1)] dt
o p (t') q
- p e(t') ( +M ,(t)) [AM fM(t, t') - pL (t')AKfK(t, t')dt. (A. 13)
Note that if K = 0, this expression simplifies to Eq. A.3, where p - q.
We can also express the radiative forcing error by comparing the sector's radiative forcing
budget with its actual radiative forcing. This approach allows us to more clearly see the
radiative forcing behavior of small sectors, which is masked when total radiative forcing
functions are used. We calculate the sector radiative forcing budget as the difference between
the total radiative forcing in the C0 2-only emissions case, RFT and the radiative forcing due
to all emissions not allocated to the sector, which we call the background radiative forcing,
RFB. Thus, the sector's planned radiative forcing budget RFp is
RFp(t) = RFT(t) - RFB(t), (A.14)
and ARFs, the difference between actual and planned radiative forcing for the sector, is
equal to
ARFs(t) =RFs(t) - RFp(t) (A. 15)
=RFs(t) - [RFT(t) - RFB(t)], (A.16)
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where RFs is the actual radiative forcing pathway. Written in terms of the equations for
emissions and concentrations, this is equal to
ARFs = p LAK
ft(
JO0
714K - 1) e(t')fKt, t') + AM
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(A.17)tI e- (t) fm ( t)
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